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∎ Georgia’s political leadership has been pursuing close ties to the United 
States and a geopolitical positioning in “the West” at least since the presi-
dency of Mikheil Saakashvili. A formal Strategic Partnership has struc-
tured the relationship since 2009. 
∎ Donald Trump’s “America First” policy and the transition to a supposedly 
less pro-American political leadership in Georgia have raised questions 
over the status of the bilateral relationship. 
∎ Georgian-US ties remain close and have intensified in recent years. They 
are still essential to Tbilisi. But the two sides do not always associate the 
same expectations, functions and priorities with the Strategic Partnership. 
∎ Washington prioritises democracy and rule of law, and corresponding 
reforms in Georgia. Tbilisi concentrates on security and defence and in-
creasingly also economic and trade cooperation. 
∎ The biggest obstacle to a further deepening of the relationship, however, 
is Washington’s lack of a strategic vision for Georgia and the region. 
∎ This strategic void places limits on Tbilisi’s efforts to establish its own 
imagined geography in Washington. Without a clear US strategy the Stra-
tegic Partnership perpetuates Georgia’s liminality, its suspension between 
“east” and “west”. In this respect it resembles Georgia’s Association Agree-
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Issues and Conclusions 
The Strategic Partnership between 
Georgia and the United States: 
Vision Wanted 
When Donald Trump was elected 45th President of 
the United States in 2016 under the slogan “America 
First”, many countries found themselves wondering 
about their future relations with the world’s leading 
power. In the post-Soviet space the question was most 
pressing for Georgia. Tbilisi had pursued close ties 
with the United States at least since Mikheil Saakash-
vili assumed the presidency in 2004, seeking to 
counterbalance Georgia’s historical and geographical 
liminality – its intermediacy between “east” and 
“west” – with a strategic policy. While George W. 
Bush had lauded Georgia as a “beacon of liberty” and 
Tbilisi named the main road to its airport after him, 
the Obama administration had introduced a note of 
sobriety. In 2016, the year of Trump’s election, elec-
tions were also held in Georgia. The Georgian Dream 
coalition, which had defeated Mikheil Saakashvili’s 
United National Movement in 2012, remained the 
strongest political force and began its second term. 
Critics of Georgian Dream complained that known 
pro-Americans with good contacts in Washington 
had successively left the governing coalition. They 
interpreted this as a sign that Georgian Dream was 
turning away from its predecessor’s transatlantic 
course or pursuing it less consistently. Despite Wash-
ington’s supposed disengagement from the region 
under Donald Trump and the impression that there 
are fewer prominent and outspoken Americanophiles 
in Georgian Dream, relations between Tbilisi and 
Washington have deepened in recent years. This ap-
plies above all to security and defence policy, as 
exemplified by the long-awaited sale of Javelin anti-
tank missiles to Georgia. 
These sometimes contradictory elements and 
diverging perceptions give good reason to take a 
closer look at how the Georgian-American relation-
ship has developed, especially during the period of 
the Trump administration and Georgian Dream’s 
second term. The present analysis centres on the Stra-
tegic Partnership, which has formed the backbone of 
the relationship since 2009. How has it taken shape? 
What functions does each side attribute to it? Where 
do the two partners concur, and where do they differ? 
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What positions does each take towards the other, 
for example with respect to shared goals and mutual 
expectations?  
Cooperation with the (member states of the) Euro-
pean Union and with the United States form the 
principal axes of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration 
course. The study illuminates the extent to which 
Georgia’s cooperation with the United States com-
plements, reinforces and potentially also deviates 
from the policy of the European Union, which is 
connected to Georgia by an Association Agreement 
and a Free Trade Agreement. The European Union, 
NATO and the United States – which from a Geor-
gian perspective and in institutional-geographic terms 
constitute an imagined “West” – have been points 
of reference of Georgian politics at the latest since the 
mid-2000s. At the same time, the goal of joining the 
EU and NATO is still not within reach. The present 
analysis of the American-Georgian Strategic Partner-
ship reveals the complexity of the geopolitical tran-
sition sought by Tbilisi, to anchor Georgia in “the 
West”. It shows how the Strategic Partnership essen-
tially reproduces Georgia’s geopolitical “in-between-
ness”. These observations are also relevant to rela-
tions between the EU and Georgia. 
The American-Georgian Strategic Partnership 
has four core areas: (a) democracy and governance, 
(b) defence and security, (c) economic, trade and 
energy cooperation, and (d) people-to-people and 
cultural exchanges. As such it covers a broad spec-
trum of topics and fields of cooperation. Democracy 
and governance, defence and security – and from 
the Georgian perspective increasingly also economic, 
trade and energy cooperation – are the central 
aspects of mutual cooperation (intentions). 
Both sides attempt to advance their own interests 
in the Strategic Partnership. Democratic and rule of 
law reforms were already one of Washington’s prior-
ities in 2009, when this cooperation format was 
launched. Shared values form an integral component 
of the bilateral understanding. But from the Georgian 
perspective – as already under Saakashvili – this 
prioritisation risks creating a conflict between domes-
tic and external role concepts, for example if such 
reforms potentially undermine established power 
structures. Not least for that reason, the Georgian 
leadership appears to emphasise security and defence 
cooperation, and prospectively economic and trade 
cooperation. Cooperation on security and defence has 
been adjusted and expanded, and now explicitly sup-
ports Georgian territorial defence. In terms of eco-
nomic and trade cooperation, Tbilisi is seeking to 
anchor the idea of Georgia as a trade and logistics hub 
between the EU and China. The central challenge for 
Georgia, however, is that Washington possesses no 
strategic vision for the country or the region. That 
makes it hard for Georgia to justify its own strategic 
relevance or its belonging to the “West”, to establish 
this “imagined geography” in Washington, and thus 
to deepen and develop the Strategic Partnership in its 
own directions. But this has been the case since the 
end of the Bush administration and cannot be attri-
buted solely to President Trump. 
 
 Introduction 
 SWP Berlin 
 The Strategic Partnership between Georgia and the United States: Vision Wanted 
 December 2020 
 7 
The starting point of the study is the complex and 
sometimes contradictory perspectives on the state of 
the Georgian-American relationship since the begin-
ning of the Trump presidency and under the govern-
ment of the Georgian Dream. The study examines the 
relationship through the lens of the Strategic Partner-
ship between Georgia and the United States, which 
has structured mutual relations since it was estab-
lished in 2009. 
The analysis sets out to answer the following ques-
tions: What functions do Tbilisi and Washington 
attribute to the Strategic Partnership? What rights, 
obligations and expectations do they associate with 
the mutual relationship? How does each position 
itself vis-à-vis the other, how are they themselves 
positioned? And: how strategic is the Strategic Part-
nership?1  
The study analyses the construction of the Strategic 
Partnership, the way it is elaborated by the participat-
ing actors. It draws on official documents from both 
sides as well as joint statements on the Strategic Part-
nership. Insights from twenty-five semi-structured 
interviews conducted in Washington and Tbilisi with 
serving and former diplomats, government officials, 
experts and other actors also flow into the analysis.2 
 
1 Luis Fernando Blanco, “The Functions of ‘Strategic Part-
nership’ in European Union Foreign Policy Discourse”, Cam-
bridge Review of International Affairs 29, no. 1 (2016): 36–54 
(40). See also the text box “Strategic Partnership – an Un-
defined Concept” on p. 15 in this publication. 
2 Publications of the two governments, in particular their 
foreign and defence ministries, and the respective parlia-
ments were systematically reviewed. The relevant primary 
documents were compiled in a database and analysed using 
MaxQDA. I am especially grateful to Belinda Nüssel for her 
assistance with this aspect of the research. As well as pri-
mary documents and interviews, secondary literature was 
also analysed. 
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Georgia and the United States can now look back at 
almost three decades of shared relations. Although a 
significant development process is observed over the 
course of that period and the political actors have 
changed on both sides, echoes of earlier episodes are 
found throughout the present relationship, whether 
through continuity, evolution or explicit distancing. 
A review can therefore tell us a great deal about the 
state of the relationship today. 
The Beginnings 
Under President Eduard Shevardnadze, who ruled 
from 1992 to 2003,3 Georgia was already turning 
increasingly to the West and especially the United 
States. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, and in 
particular since the centralisation of Russian foreign 
policy under President Vladimir Putin, Moscow has 
regarded the South Caucasus as significant for the 
stability of its North Caucasus republics and of Russia 
as a whole. This is associated with claims to a sphere 
of influence in the region. Tbilisi sought to escape 
that influence, and benefitted from Washington’s 
efforts to install its own liberal values in the post-
Soviet states. That in turn drew criticism from Mos-
cow, which felt Washington was encroaching into 
its own neighbourhood where it asserts overriding 
interests. That basic constellation is a defining factor 
in the region’s geopolitical configuration to this day.4 
 
3 Shevardnadze was Chairman of the Parliament from 
1992 to 1995, from 1995 President of Georgia. 
4 Kornely Kakachia et al., “Change and Continuity in 
the Foreign Policies of Small States: Elite Perceptions and 
Georgia’s Foreign Policy towards Russia”, Europe-Asia Studies 
70, no. 5 (2018): 814–31; Sergey M. Markedonov and Maxim 
A. Suchkov, “Russia and the United States in the Caucasus: 
Cooperation and Competition”, Caucasus Survey 8, no. 2 
(2020): 179–95; Jason Bruder, “The US and the New Eastern 
Europe (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and 
The United States began supplying humanitarian 
and financial aid to Georgia in the course of the 
1990s. Washington’s engagement in the region was 
also driven by its interest in developing the Caspian 
hydrocarbon reserves and supplying oil and gas to 
Europe on an east-west axis passing through Georgia 
but avoiding Russia. By the end of the 1990s Wash-
ington’s financial aid was increasingly channelled 
towards democratisation – and made conditional on 
the implementation of democratic reforms. President 
Shevardnadze’s announcement in 2002 that Georgia 
was seeking full membership of NATO, was a clear 
signal of the country’s turn to the West. The begin-
nings of bilateral security cooperation also lie in the 
Shevardnadze era, with the US military training Geor-
gian forces between 2002 and 2004 under the Georgia 
Train and Equip Program (GTEP), and Georgia’s par-
ticipation from 2003 in Operation Iraqi Freedom.5 
Personalisation and Symbolism under 
Saakashvili and Bush 
By the end of the 1990s, Washington’s financial sup-
port was increasingly flowing to civil society insti-
tutions and actors,6 many of whom later became rep-
resentatives of the new Georgian political elite that 
rose to power through the so-called Rose Revolution 
 
Azerbaijan) since 1991”, in Managing Security Threats along the 
EU’s Eastern Flanks, ed. Rick Fawn (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2020), 69–97; Gerard Toal, Near Abroad: Putin, the West and 
the Contest over Ukraine and the Caucasus (New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2017). See also the text box “Georgia and NATO: 
Developments through 2008” on p. 11 in this publication. 
5 The US-led Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations 
Program was launched in 2005 to enhance the capability of 
Georgian forces participating in Operation Iraqi Freedom. 
6 Archil Gegeshidze, Contemporary Georgian-American Rela-
tions: Key Features of the Evolution, Expert Opinion 74 (Tbilisi: 
Rondeli Foundation, 2017), 7. 
A Brief History of Georgian-
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of 2003. The government of the reformer and mod-
erniser Mikheil Saakashvili (2004–2012) propagated 
an unequivocally pro-Western course with the de-
clared goal of integrating Georgia into the Euro-Atlan-
tic structures. In the process, in fact, it drew on many 
elements that can be traced back to the Shevardnadze 
era.7 Until the end of the 1990s the intensification of 
relations with Western actors, first and foremost the 
United States, tended to be discreet, and initially com-
plemented parallel relations with Russia. The Saa-
kashvili government’s overt pro-Western orientation, 
by contrast, was soon embedded in a pronounced 
discourse of distancing from Russia.8 
Saakashvili presented Georgia to 
“the West” as a trailblazer for 
democracy and “Western” values 
in the post-Soviet space. 
Saakashvili presented Georgia to “the West” as a 
trailblazer for democracy and “Western” values in the 
post-Soviet space. This political framing or narrative 
fell on open ears in Washington under George W. 
Bush, where the “Freedom Agenda” formed a central 
trope of US foreign policy and support for democratic 
movements and democratisation processes was re-
garded as a means of combatting extremism and ter-
rorism. Georgia was often held up as a paragon.9 
Washington’s support in the scope of the GTEP was 
already also discursively embedded in America’s 
“fight against global terror”.10 In 2004 Georgian forces 
 
7 Toal, Near Abroad (see note 4), 111. 
8 David Matsaberidze, “The Foreign Policy and Security 
Nexus in Georgia”, in Harnessing Regional Stability in the South 
Caucasus: The Role and Prospects of Defence Institution Building in 
the Current Strategic Context, ed. Frederic Labarre and George 
Niculescu, Study Group Information 10/2017 (Vienna, 
August 2017), 49–64 (49). 
9 Toal, Near Abroad (see note 4), 107–25; Niklas Nilsson, 
“Role Conceptions, Crises, and Georgia’s Foreign Policy”, 
Cooperation and Conflict 54, no. 4 (2019): 445–65 (452); 
Thomas Carothers, U.S. Democracy Promotion during and after 
Bush (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace, 2007); Eugene Rumer et al., U.S. Policy toward 
the South Caucasus: Take Three (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, May 2017), 16–18. 
10 Here, however, Georgia was itself the addressee, with 
a programme focussing on counter-terrorism training de-
signed to bolster its stability. Linda D. Kozaryn, “U.S. Con-
siders Train and Equip Program for Georgia”, American Forces 
Press Service (online), 27 February 2002, 
joined the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) in Afghanistan. 
Another indication of the constructed synergies 
and complementarities of Georgian and American 
foreign policy in that period is the Bush administra-
tion’s assertion that it contributed to the Rose Revo-
lution by supporting Georgian civil society organi-
sations.11 In May 2005, eighteen months after the 
political transition, George W. Bush, on his first state 
visit, spoke of Georgia as a “beacon of liberty” and 
emphasised America’s friendship.12 Just a few months 
earlier the US Senators John McCain and Hillary Clin-
ton had nominated President Mikheil Saakashvili and 
his Ukrainian counterpart Viktor Yushchenko for the 
Nobel Peace Prize. This type of symbolism is especially 
characteristic of this phase of Georgian-American 
relations.13 
Such displays of friendship were rooted not least 
in an intense personalisation of the relationship. Like 
many of his cohort, Saakashvili had studied in the 
United States, which is presumably where he acquired 
some of the neoliberal ideas for his political pro-
gramme. The Georgians succeeded in maintaining 
their close relationship with Washington and turning 
it to their own ends.14 Successful lobbying, for exam-
ple, enabled Saakashvili’s government to increase the 
volume of financial support from the United States 
and expand its reach. The aid was also channelled in 
ways that placed it at the direct disposal of the govern-
ment to use for its modernisation project. In a sense 
it could be said that the money followed the civil 
society actors who had risen to positions of political 
leadership in the course of the Rose Revolution. The 
focus of Washington’s policy towards Georgia shifted 
correspondingly, from broader pursuit of democra-
 
https://archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=43902 
(accessed 12 August 2020). 
11 Fact Sheet: President Bush’s Freedom Agenda Helped Protect 
the American People, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives. 
gov/infocus/freedomagenda/ (accessed 12 August 2020). 
12 Nick Paton Walsh, “Bush Toasts Georgia as a ‘Beacon 
of Liberty’”, Guardian (online), 11 May 2005, https://www. 
theguardian.com/world/2005/may/11/georgia.usa (accessed 
12 August 2020). 
13 On symbolic politics see for example Jan Christoph Sun-
trup, “The Symbolic Politics of the State of Exception: Images 
and Performances”, Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 28, no. 4 
(2018): 565–80. 
14 Toal, Near Abroad (see note 4), 119–121. 
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tisation to direct support for Saakashvili’s govern-
ment.15 
The highly personalised relationships between 
Saakashvili’s government and his United National 
Movement (Ertiani Nationaluri Modsraoba, UNM), on 
 
15 Alexander Cooley and Lincoln Mitchell, “No Way to 
Treat Our Friends: Recasting Recent U.S.-Georgian Relations”, 
Washington Quarterly 32, no. 1 (2009): 27–41 (29); Lincoln 
Mitchell and Alexander Cooley, “After the August War: A New 
Strategy for U.S. Engagement with Georgia”, special issue, The 
Harriman Review 17, no. 3–4 (New York: Harriman Institute, 
May 2010), 14; Gegeshidze, Contemporary Georgian-American 
Relations (see note 6), 7f. 
the one side and the Republicans under George W. 
Bush on the other also affected Washington’s ability 
to influence events in advance of the so-called August 
War of 2008. According to observers, the close rela-
tionships prevented Washington from communicat-
ing effective warnings to Tbilisi to exercise caution 
towards the breakaway regions of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia. Instead Washington more or less made 
Georgia’s position towards the two secessionist en-
tities its own.16 Even before the events of August 2008 
 
16 Cooley and Mitchell, “No Way to Treat Our Friends” (see 
note 15), 36f.; Michael Kofman, “The August War, Ten Years 
Georgia and NATO: Developments through 2008 
Georgian-American relations are closely bound up with Geor-
gia’s relationship with NATO, where Washington’s favourable 
attitude is reflected. The relationship between NATO and 
Georgia deepened steadily from the early 1990s.
a
 Georgia joined 
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1992
b
 and the Part-
nership for Peace two years later. By 1999 Georgian forces were 
participating in NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR). At the 2002 Prague 
NATO summit Georgia stated its wish to join NATO, and an 
Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) was agreed in 2004. 
In 2006 NATO began an Intensified Dialogue (ID) with Georgia 
about its accession wish, explicitly without preempting a 
decision. 
The events of August 2008 were preceded by the NATO 
summit in Bucharest in April, where differences among NATO 
members over the question of Georgian accession became 
obvious. From Georgia’s perspective, in light of its own threat 
perceptions, joining NATO was the centrepiece of its efforts to 
integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures. NATO membership in 
particular promised strategic inclusion in the “Western com-
munity”, an effective guarantee against possible Russian aggres-
sion and in general terms a shield for its own independence 
and stability. Despite NATO’s “open door” policy and a certain 
degree of support within the organisation, the member states 
were never in full agreement on whether the accession wish 
could be fulfilled (nor are they today). The sceptics cite various 
arguments: As well as the factor of Russia, which would regard 
accession as crossing a red line with respect to its own national 
security, the unresolved conflicts over the secessionist regions 
or de facto states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia need to be fac-
tored in, along with the geographical difficulties of actually 
defending Georgia in case of need – and associated doubts over 
the strategic added value for the alliance.
c
 
Washington was one of Tbilisi’s supporters at the Bucharest 
NATO summit in 2008, and argued for approval for Membership 
Action Plans (MAPs) for Georgia and Ukraine. An MAP is gener-
ally regarded as the precursor to membership. Washington also 
attempted to persuade NATO to adopt this position. Others like  
 France and Germany were much more cautious with respect to 
an MAP, still more so concerning the possibility of actual mem-
bership.
d
 Although the NATO members did agree in Bucharest 
to offer Georgia and Ukraine a prospect of membership, they 
avoided naming any timetable. Nor was Tbilisi granted a Mem-
bership Action Plan. The August War just a few months later 
reinforced the scepticism of the doubters, who interpreted 
the conflict as a message to NATO, Georgia and other potential 
accession candidates that Russia would not sit back and watch 
enlargement happen.
e
 And it made it even more complicated to 
reach agreement among the NATO states about the possibility of 
an MAP or accession for Georgia. Instead they agreed in Septem-
ber 2008 to deepen cooperation by means of a NATO-Georgia 
Commission.
f
 In December 2008 the Individual Partnership 
Action Plan was superseded by an Annual National Programme. 
a Georgia’s relations with NATO can only be summarised 
superficially here. The scope of the study precludes a de-
tailed description. The same applies to the NATO-Georgia-
relationship after 2008. 
b From 1997 the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. 
c S. Neil MacFarlane, Two Years of the Dream: Georgian Foreign 
Policy during the Transition, Russia and Eurasia Programme 
(London: Chatham House, 2015), 2; Sebastian Mayer, “The 
EU and NATO in Georgia: Complementary and Overlapping 
Security Strategies in a Precarious Environment”, European 
Security 26, no. 3 (2017): 435–53 (438); Tracey German, 
“NATO and the Enlargement Debate: Enhancing Euro-Atlan-
tic Security or Inciting Confrontation?” International Affairs 
93, no. 2 (2017): 291–308. 
d Toal, Near Abroad (see note 4), 94f.; Mayer, “The EU and 
NATO in Georgia” (see note c), 438. 
e German, “NATO and the Enlargement Debate” 
(see note c), 299f. 
f Mayer, “The EU and NATO in Georgia” (see note c), 438f. 
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there had been no clear criticism from Washington of 
the increasingly authoritarian course of the Saakash-
vili government outside of confidential diplomatic 
channels. 
Readjustment after the August War 
The August War and its aftermath did not represent 
an outright turning point in American-Georgian rela-
tions, but was a significant episode in two respects. 
Washington’s verbal support remained steadfast 
throughout the conflict and enormous funds were 
provided for reconstruction (more than $1 billion 
in 2008–2009).17 Yet the aftermath saw growing 
disillusionment, at least in parts of the US political 
spectrum. In particular Washington became more 
cautious concerning military cooperation, especially 
aspects designed to strengthen Georgia’s defensive 
capabilities.18 From Tbilisi’s perspective the August 
War raised questions over Washington’s willingness 
to back Georgia against its powerful neighbour – not 
only rhetorically but also in practical terms – and to 
respond effectively to Russia’s actions against Georgia. 
Georgians began to doubt whether the United States 
was on board with the Georgian narrative about 
the August War, or failing to live up to their expec-
tations.19 
 
On: A Retrospective on the Russo-Georgian War”, War on the 
Rocks (online), 17 August 2018, https://warontherocks.com/ 
2018/08/the-august-war-ten-years-on-a-retrospective-on-the-
russo-georgian-war/ (accessed 12 August 2020). Describing 
the different and in some respects contradictory inter-
pretations of the five-day war of August 2008 is beyond the 
scope of this study. For a detailed account see Toal, Near 
Abroad (see note 4). 
17 Mitchell and Cooley, After the August War (see note 15), 
16; Gegeshidze, Contemporary Georgian-American Relations 
(see note 6), 10. 
18 Cory Welt, “The United States, the South Caucasus and 
Euro-Atlantic Integration”, in The South Caucasus – Security, 
Energy and Europeanization, ed. Meliha B. Altunisik and Oktay 
F. Tanrisever (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018), 253–70 (262f.); 
Par Shalva Dzebisashvili, Transforming Defence: Examining 
NATO’s Role in Institutional Changes of South Caucasus Countries 
(A Comparative Study of Armenia and Georgia), Ph.D. diss., Uni-
versität Bielefeld and Université Libre de Bruxelles, 2016, 
259; Nilsson, “Role Conceptions, Crises, and Georgia’s For-
eign Policy” (see note 9), 456. 
19 Svante E. Cornell, “The Raucous Caucasus”, The Ameri-
can Interest (online), 2 May 2017, https://www.the-american-
interest.com/2017/05/02/the-raucous-caucasus/; George Khe-
The Democrat Barack Obama was elected US Presi-
dent in November 2008 – just a few months after 
the August War – and succeeded his Republican pre-
decessor Bush in January 2009. Now the personalised 
nature of relations between Washington and Tbilisi 
became a drawback: When the Republican President 
left the White House the Saakashvili government lost 
its contacts in the administration. Its good relation-
ships in Congress and influential think-tanks remained 
important, however.20 While external observers re-
garded this process of depersonalisation of mutual 
relations as necessary and “healthy”, it may at least 
at first have confirmed Georgian perceptions that the 
Obama administration had abandoned its predeces-
sor’s prioritisation of their country. 
Continuities and Discontinuities under 
Obama and Georgian Dream 
Under Mikheil Saakashvili and George W. Bush rela-
tions between Georgia and the United States were 
highly symbolically charged, ideologically driven and 
personalised. During Barack Obama’s two terms the 
tone became more sober. Georgia now experienced 
geostrategic downsizing, after a period where success-
ful lobbying and close personal contacts in Washing-
ton had enabled the “construction of strategic impor-
tance”.21 This strategy became harder to pursue with 
the Obama administration. 
 
lashvili, Georgia’s Foreign Policy Impasse: Is Consensus Crumbling? 
Ponars Eurasia Policy Memo 187 (Washington, D.C.: 
The George Washington University Elliott School of Inter-
national Affairs, September 2011), 1, http://www.ucss.ge/ 
Khelshvili%20ponars-%20187-2011-09.pdf (accessed 12 
August 2020). 
20 George Khelashvili, “Obama and Georgia: A Year-Long 
Awkward Silence”, Caucasus Analytical Digest, no. 13 (2010): 
8–10 (9); Gegeshidze, Contemporary Georgian-American Rela-
tions (see note 6), 10–12. 
21 Alexander Cooley and Daniel Nexon, “Interpersonal 
Networks and International Security: US-Georgia Relations 
during the Bush Administration”, in The New Power Politics: 
Networks and Transnational Security Governance, ed. Deborah 
Avant and Oliver Westerwinter (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), 74–102. 
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Under Obama Georgia experienced 
geostrategic downsizing 
in Washington. 
Alongside the depersonalisation of relations with 
Georgia, Obama began his presidency with a so-called 
reset with Russia. Washington’s intention was to halt 
the downward spiral and turn Russia into a partner 
at the international level.22 Although Obama declared 
that the reset would not occur at the expense of coun-
tries like Georgia, the visibility of Georgia and the 
South Caucasus as a whole did decline. There was no 
regional strategy in which US policy towards Georgia 
could have been embedded. Instead the focus of US 
foreign policy turned to other regions like Asia and 
the Middle East.23 One sign of that shift was that Saa-
kashvili and Obama did not meet in a bilateral con-
text until the third year of Obama’s presidency.24 
A significant political change occurred in Georgia 
too: In the 2012 parliamentary elections Saakashvili’s 
United National Movement lost to the billionaire Bid-
zina Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream coalition. Although 
Saakashvili remained president until 2013 his influ-
ence was heavily curtailed under the new parliamen-
tary system. Even if the Obama administration placed 
less importance on Georgia and formerly highly per-
sonalised relations became institutionalised, Washing-
ton still remained the “second arena of Georgian 
politics”.25 Tbilisi continued to attribute great signifi-
 
22 Brian Whitmore, “Georgia Rethinks the ‘Reset’”, Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty (online), 24 June 2010, https://www. 
rferl.org/a/Georgia_Rethinks_The_Reset/2081523.html 
(accessed 12 August 2020); Thomas de Waal, “More Than 
Georgia on Obama’s Mind”, National Interest (online), 23 Feb-
ruary 2012, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2012/02/23/more-than-
georgia-on-obama-s-mind/bb29 (accessed 12 August 2020). 
The outgoing Bush administration had in fact already toned 
down its rhetoric towards Russia and prepared the ground 
for such a reorientation. See Pertti Joenniemi, The Georgian-
Russian Conflict: A Turning-point? DIIS Working Paper 2 (Copen-
hagen: Danish Institute for International Studies [DIIS], 
2010), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep13369?seq=1#meta 
data_info_tab_contents (accessed 12 August 2020). On the 
reset see also Ruth Deyermond, “Assessing the Reset: Suc-
cesses and Failures in the Obama Administration’s Russia 
Policy, 2009–2012”, European Security 22, no. 4 (2013): 500–23. 
23 Cornell, “The Raucous Caucasus” (see note 19); Khelash-
vili, “Obama and Georgia” (see note 20), 9. 
24 De Waal, “More Than Georgia on Obama’s Mind” 
(see note 22). 
25 Thomas de Waal, Mrs. Clinton Goes to Georgia (Brussels: 
Carnegie Europe, 4 June 2012), https://carnegieeurope.eu/ 
cance to Washington, also – but not only – in the 
context of the national elections in 2012. That is re-
flected not least in the sums paid by both Saakashvili 
and Ivanishvili to private lobbying firms to promote 
the one and discredit the other. Between them they 
reportedly spent about $4.8 million. The French daily 
Le Figaro described this as the “Guerre des lobbies 
géorgiens à Washington”.26 
As this demonstrates, the political changes in 
Washington and Tbilisi did not upturn every aspect 
of American-Georgian relations. At least during Geor-
gian Dream’s first term (2012 to 2016) the new leader-
ship in Tbilisi included a string of decidedly pro-West-
ern, pro-American politicians in key posts. These in-
cluded Defence Minister Irakli Alasania (2012–2014), 
Defence Minister Tina Khidasheli (2015–2016), Speak-
er of Parliament David Usupashvili (2012–2016) and 
Tedo Japaridze, chair of the parliamentary foreign 
affairs committee (2012–2016). Their significance 
for Georgian-American relations in this period should 
not be underestimated. Many in Washington were 
wary of Ivanishvili in particular. With his new gov-
ernment propagating a normalisation of relations 
with Russia, concerns grew that Tbilisi might abandon 
its Euro-Atlantic course.27 
Georgia’s political parties are often hard to distin-
guish in ideological or even merely programmatic 
terms. It is even harder in the case of the Georgian 
Dream alliance, led by Ivanishvili’s party, Georgian 
Dream – Democratic Georgia (Kartuli ocneba – De-
mok’rat’iuli Sakartvelo). In 2012 the Georgian Dream 
coalition brought together very heterogeneous cur-
rents. It tended to be associated with support for the 
welfare state while Saakashvili’s United National 
 
2012/06/04/mrs.-clinton-goes-to-georgia-pub-48338 (accessed 
12 August 2020). The Ukraine conflict did, however, draw 
Washington’s attention back to countries like Georgia, while 
US relations with Russia deteriorated significantly. 
26 Laure Mandeville, “Guerre des lobbies géorgiens à 
Washington”, Le Figaro (online), 21 June 2012, https://www. 
lefigaro.fr/international/2012/06/21/01003-20120621ARTFIG 
00577-guerre-des-lobbies-georgiens-a-washington.php (ac-
cessed 12 August 2020). On Georgian lobbying in Washing-
ton see also Kevin Bogardus and Julian Pecquet, “K Street’s 
Gravy Train Runs Dry as Georgian Leaders Move Past Elec-
tion”, The Hill (online), 6 March 2013, https://thehill.com/ 
policy/international/286425-k-streets-gravy-train-runs-dry-as-
georgia-moves-past-election (accessed 12 August 2020). 
27 S. Neil MacFarlane, Two Years of the Dream: Georgian For-
eign Policy during the Transition, Russia and Eurasia Programme 
(London: Chatham House, 2015), 3, 9. 
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Movement (UNM) pursued liberal or libertarian 
domestic economic policies, but personalities were 
more important than programmes.28 In foreign policy 
the UNM stood out for its highly negative stance 
towards Russia and sought to monopolise this posi-
tion within the political landscape. Georgian Dream 
called for a pragmatic, less conflictual relationship. 
The new coalition government took 
up where its predecessor left off, and 
retaining the objective of Euro-
Atlantic integration. 
In fact the new coalition government took up 
where its predecessor left off, retaining the objective 
of Euro-Atlantic integration.29 This was codified in a 
cross-party resolution adopted by the Georgian par-
liament in 2013 and reconfirmed in 2016. It defines 
membership of the EU and NATO as priorities, along 
with expanding relations with the United States as 
the most important strategic partner and ally.30 Tbilisi 
also continued to participate in US-led international 
missions, including the Georgian contingent in Af-
ghanistan; under Georgian Dream Georgia still pro-
vided the largest contingent of any non-NATO state in 
Afghanistan.31 The military sphere – especially with-
 
28 Levan Kakhishvili, The Socializing Effects of Georgian Parties’ 
Membership in European Political Party Federations (Tbilisi: Geor-
gian Institute of Politics, October 2018). 
29 Levan Kakhishvili, Protests in Tbilisi: What Can Be Learned 
about the Role of Russia as an Issue in Georgian Party Competition? 
(Tbilisi: Georgian Institute of Politics, 4 July 2019), http:// 
gip.ge/protests-in-tbilisi-what-can-be-learned-about-the-role-
of-russia-as-an-issue-in-georgian-party-competition/; Kakachia 
et al., “Change and Continuity in the Foreign Policies of 
Small States” (see note 4); Markedonov and Suchkov, “Russia 
and the United States in the Caucasus” (see note 4), 187. 
30 “Parliament Adopts Bipartisan Resolution on Foreign 
Policy”, Civil.ge (online), 7 March 2013, https://civil.ge/ 
archives/122665 (accessed 1 October 2020); “Parliament 
Adopts Resolution on Foreign Policy”, Civil.ge (online), 
30 December 2016, https://civil.ge/archives/126043 (accessed 
1 October 2010); Resolution of the Parliament of Georgia on the 
Foreign Policy of Georgia, “unofficial translation”, http://www. 
parliament.ge/en/ajax/downloadFile/53452/Resolution 
(accessed 12 August 2020). The Euro-Atlantic course is also 
embedded in other strategic documents, including the 
National Military Strategy of 2014, https://mod.gov.ge/ 
uploads/2018/pdf/NMS-ENG.pdf. 
31 David Usupashvili, “Georgia, a Democratic Dream in the 
Making”, The Hill (online), 11 March 2013, https://thehill.com/ 
policy/international/287167-parliament-leader-david-usupa 
in the framework of NATO – is where relations con-
tinued to deepen even under Obama and Georgian 
Dream. In 2014 Georgia was declared a “NATO En-
hanced Opportunities” partner and the Substantial 
NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP) was launched. But 




12 August 2020). Georgia participated both in ISAF and in 
its successor, Resolute Support. 
32 For a closer examination of US-Georgian security and 
defence cooperation and relations between Georgia and NATO 
from 2008, see pp. 22ff. in this publication. 
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The review of the development of US-Georgia rela-
tions laid out above supplies essential background for 
assessing developments during the Trump adminis-
tration and Georgian Dream’s second term. On the 
one hand, it identifies path dependencies in the sense 
of persistent practices that survive to this day. On the 
other, comparison with earlier episodes reveals the 
heights with which the current relationship must 
be compared (and the source of expectations on both 
sides of the very unequal bilateral relationship). 
The current format of relations has existed at the 
institutional level since 2009. While NATO created 
the NATO-Georgia Commission after the August War, 
the signing of the US-Georgia Charter on Strategic 
Partnership on 9 January 2009, in consultation with 
the incoming Obama administration, established a 
new bilateral Georgian-American format. The first 
annual meeting of the Strategic Partnership Commis-
sion was held on 22 June 2009. To this day the Stra-
tegic Partnership structures mutual cooperation as 
the “primary mechanism for organizing and 
prioritizing the broad and deepening cooperation 
between the US and Georgia”, including bringing 
together high-ranking actors from both sides for 
regular meetings.33 The question arose whether the 
Strategic Partnership between Tbilisi and Washing-
ton – like the NATO-Georgia Commission – must 
instead be regarded as a consolation prize. The Geor-
gian side for its part lauded it – at least publicly – 
as a further step towards becoming an alliance part-
ner of the United States.34 
 
33 U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement of the U.S.-
Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission Defense and Secu-
rity Cooperation Working Group”, press release, 1 October 
2018, https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-of-the-u-s-georgia-
strategic-partnership-commission-defense-and-security-
cooperation-working-group-2/ (accessed 12 August 2020). 
34 Mitchell and Cooley, After the August War (see note 15), 
17f., 22. In order to avoid misunderstandings, the American 
Georgia experts Mitchell and Cooley advise Washington to 
It would not be entirely accurate to characterise 
the American-Georgian Strategic Partnership as a 
rigid, predetermined format, even if its form has re-
mained unchanged since it was established. The four 
core areas – namely (a) democracy and governance, 
(b) defence and security, (c) economic, trade and 
energy cooperation and (d) people-to-people and cul-
tural exchanges – have remained constant through-
out and roughly circumscribe the extent of mutual 
cooperation. Democracy/governance and defence/ 
security in particular attract special attention for 
various reasons and offer insights into developments 
in the shared and individual agendas, into reciprocal 
expectations and into the function attributed to the 
Strategic Partnership – and thus also into the nature 
of the mutual relationship altogether. 
Strategic Partnership as 
Democratisation Imperative 
From the outset the Strategic Partnership prioritised 
democracy and governance, not least in response 
to criticisms that Washington had long neglected to 
address the democratic deficits that existed under 
Mikheil Saakashvili. According to the United States–
Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership, the coopera-
tion is both based on shared values including democ-
racy and rule of law and intended to strengthen them 
 
clarify that the Strategic Partnership with Georgia does not 
provide security guarantees. Cory Welt, How Strategic Is the 
US-Georgia Strategic Partnership?, in the seminar series Limited 
Sovereignty and Soft Borders in Southeastern Europe and 
the Former Soviet States: The Challenges and Political Con-
sequences of Future Changes in Legal Status (New York: 
Harriman Institute, Columbia University, March 2010); 
idem., Georgia: Background and U.S. Policy, CRS Report 45307 
(Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service [CRS], 
1 April 2019), 1. 
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in Georgia.35 Observers regard the second component 
as one of Washington’s principal interests, creating a 
strong asymmetry in the partnership through a one-
sided orientation on identifying and overcoming in-
ternal political deficits on the Georgian side.36 That 
prioritisation remains current, as evidenced by the 
10th Anniversary Joint Declaration on the U.S.–Geor-
gia Strategic Partnership of June 2019. Like its prede-
 
35 U.S. Department of State, “United States-Georgia Charter 
on Strategic Partnership”, press release, 9 January 2009, 
https://www.state.gov/united-states-georgia-charter-on-
strategic-partnership/ (accessed 17 March 2020). 
36 Mitchell and Cooley, After the August War (see note 15), 
18; Welt, How Strategic Is the US-Georgia Strategic Partnership? 
(see note 34), 2, 10. The NATO-Georgia Commission estab-
lished following the August War also focusses on democratic 
and institutional reforms. 
cessor in 2009, the Declaration ten years later also 
lists promoting an independent judiciary, democratic 
elections, media pluralism and democratic checks and 
balances in Georgia as objectives of cooperation. It ex-
plicitly notes that the United States and Georgia will 
cooperate on these matters with “all stakeholders”.37 
As the developments of 2020 underline, Washington 
continues to regard a “democratisation imperative” 
as central to the Strategic Partnership – despite the 
diverging transactional rhetoric from President 
Trump’s White House. 
 
37 U.S. Department of State, “10th Anniversary Joint 
Declaration on the U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership”, press 
release, 11 June 2019, https://www.state.gov/10th-
anniversary-joint-declaration-on-the-u-s-georgia-strategic-
partnership/ (accessed 17 March 2020). 
Strategic Partnership – an Undefined Concept 
The concept of the Strategic Partnership is a chameleon of inter-
national relations. The spectrum of strategic partnerships is as 
broad as the motivations behind them – which need not nec-
essarily be identical on both sides.
a
 While some strategic part-
nerships are based on shared norms and values, in other cases 
the designation indicates such congruence – if at all – more as 
a long-term goal than a starting point or current state of affairs. 
The term certainly does not always indicate a special or espe-
cially close relationship: “Some partnerships link friends or 
potential friends; some link actual or putative rivals.”
b
 Neither 
in foreign policy practice nor in the academic discussion is 
there a standard definition. The lowest common denominator 
appears to be that it concerns “a specific form of bilateral diplo-
matic engagement”.
c
 More recently researchers have been 
categorising strategic partnerships under the heading of “align-
ment”. Unlike an “alliance”, which clearly relates to security, 
alignment is neutral in values and content and therefore well 
suited to capture the more recent multi-dimensional and 
flexible formats of international relations.
d
  
The empirical diversity of strategic partnerships, and the 
lack of an accepted definition, raises the question of the extent 
to which they actually represent a concrete form of foreign 
policy cooperation at all, or whether they are not simply rhe-
torical devices or pure lip service.
e
 What that overlooks is that 
strategic partnerships are not static and their content not fixed. 
They are social constructs that change and develop in the pro-
cess of discursive interaction – the “conversation” – between 
the involved parties; they are politically imagined and jointly 
shaped by the involved actors. The answer to the question 
“What is a strategic partnership?”
f
 is thus: “Strategic partner-
ships are what states make of them.”
g
 
 a The political scientists Pan and Michalski for example 
reveal the degree of variation in their typology, in which 
they distinguish a) homogeneous, b) functional (“come-in-
handy”), c) marriage-of-convenience, and d) heterogeneous 
strategic partnerships. Zhongqi Pan and Anna Michalski, 
“Contending Logics of Strategic Partnership in International 
Politics”, Asia Europe Journal 17 (2019): 265–80 (275–278). 
On the different motivations see also Sean Kay, “What Is a 
Strategic Partnership?” Problems of Post-Communism 47, no. 3 
(2000): 15–24. 
b H. D. P. Envall and Ian Hall, “Asian Strategic Partner-
ships: New Practices and Regional Security Governance”, 
Asian Politics and Policy 8, no. 1 (2016): 87–105 (88). 
c Pan and Michalski, “Contending Logics of Strategic Part-
nership” (see note a), 267. 
d Colleen Chidley, “Towards a Framework of Alignment in 
International Relations”, Politikon 41, no. 1 (2014): 141–57 
(143, 146); Thomas S. Wilkins, “‘Alignment’, Not ‘Alliance’ – 
The Shifting Paradigm of International Security Cooperation: 
Toward a Conceptual Taxonomy of Alignment”, Review of 
International Studies 38, no. 1 (2012): 53–76. Chidley goes 
further than Wilkins, arguing that the term “alignment” 
needs to be completely stripped of any security connota-
tions. Wilkins on the other hand sees the difference in the 
treaty commitment to provide military assistance, which 
characterises an “alliance” but is not necessarily given with 
“alignment”. 
e Wilkins, “‘Alignment’, Not ‘Alliance’” (see note d), 67. 
f Kay, “What Is a Strategic Partnership?” (see note a). 
g Andriy Tyushka and Lucyna Czechowska, “Strategic 
Partnerships, International Politics and IR Theory”, in States, 
International Organizations and Strategic Partnerships, ed. Lucyna 
Czechowska et al. (Cheltenham, 2019), 8–43 (36).  
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Critical Letters from Washington 
In winter 2019/20 senior members of the US House of 
Representatives and Senate sent critical letters to the 
Georgian government, occasioned in the first place by 
the conflict between government and opposition over 
the modalities for the October 2020 parliamentary 
elections. In connection with protests in summer 2019 
the government had promised electoral reform, and 
taken on board the protesters’ demand that the 2020 
elections be held under a fully proportional system. 
In the Washington news outlet The Hill, which is 
widely read by US politicians from both main parties, 
the then Georgian Prime Minister Mamuka Bakhtadze 
presented the electoral reform as having already 
occurred.38 But the parliamentary vote in autumn 
2019 failed because many deputies from the ruling 
party chose not to support it. After a series of meet-
ings facilitated by Western diplomats the government 
and opposition agreed a new compromise on 8 March 
2020. As far as the government was concerned the 
reform was implemented in June 2020, when parlia-
ment passed the amendments to the electoral law. 
The most important innovation was that in the Octo-
ber 2020 parliamentary election 120 rather than 
previously just 77 of the 150 seats were determined 
by proportional representation.39 According to the 
official results Georgian Dream won the October vote, 
gaining 90 seats. Opposition parties, however, dis-
puted the results, condemned the vote as rigged and 
boycotted the run-offs. As in the spring, US and EU 
diplomats sought to facilitate talks between Georgian 
 
38 “Most recently, our younger generation requested that 
we expedite our existing plans to make our parliament more 
representative through a fully proportional electoral system. 
We made that change quickly, and we are excited that this 
change in the 2020 elections will empower greater political 
participation and a more open political playing field.” 
Mamuka Bakhtadze, “Support Act Will Bolster Georgia’s 
Trade and Security Partnership with America”, The Hill 
(online), 9 August 2019, https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-
blog/ foreign-policy/456886-support-act-will-bolster-georgias-
trade-and-security (accessed 19 May 2020). 
39 Two opposition groups, the United National Movement 
and European Georgia, were dissatisfied with the compro-
mise and boycotted the vote. “Georgia Transforms Electoral 
System ahead of October Parliamentary Elections”, OC Media 
(online), 29 June 2020, https://oc-media.org/georgia-transforms-
electoral-system-ahead-of-october-parliamentary-elections/ 
(accessed 12 August 2020). 
Dream and the opposition to find a way out of the 
ensuing political deadlock. 
The criticisms laid out in the letters go further, 
however. The two co-chairs of the U.S. Congressional 
Georgia Caucus,40 the Republican Adam Kinzinger and 
the Democrat Gerald Connolly, wrote on 13 Decem-
ber 2019 to Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Gakharia 
that they were “shocked to hear about the collapse of 
promised reforms” and concerned about “reports of 
violence against peaceful protesters”.41 On 21 January 
2020 Connolly and Kinzinger upped the ante, writing 
to Gakharia again, together with the Democrat Eliot 
Engel, Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
and the Republican Michael McCaul, ranking member 
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee: They stressed 
the importance of ensuring the legitimacy of the par-
liamentary elections, criticised indications of politi-
cisation of the judiciary and dissemination of anti-
Western sentiment through allegedly Georgian 
Dream-funded Facebook accounts, and underlined 
that “recent democratic and economic trends are 
negatively affecting Georgia’s image in the United 
States”. Democratic institutions had to be strength-
ened, they concluded, “so that Georgia can continue 
to be a strategic partner of the United States”.42 A 
letter from the Republican Jim Risch, Chair of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the Demo-
crat Jeanne Shaheen, ranking member of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Europe and 
Regional Security Cooperation followed a week later, 
on 29 January 2020, expressing their “deep concern 
with recent developments” to the Georgian prime 
minister. They saw signs of “democratic backsliding” 
and were “particularly concerned that the independ-
ence of Georgia’s judicial system is being under-
mined”. Risch and Shaheen note that the described 
events “raise questions about Georgia’s commitment 
to our shared values”. They conclude by reiterating 
 
40 The U.S. Congressional Georgia Caucus is a bipartisan 
group of members who are interested in US-Georgian rela-
tions. 
41 Adam Kinzinger, Twitter, 16 December 2019, https:// 
twitter.com/RepKinzinger/status/1206611365894524929. 
42 Letter of Adam Kinzinger, Gerald E. Connolly, Eliot L. 
Engel and Michael T. McCaul to Giorgi Gakharia, Prime 
Minister of Georgia, 21 January 2020, https://freebeacon. 
com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Kinzinger-Jan-2020-
letter.pdf (accessed 15 September 2020). 
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that “we may be forced to reevaluate our partner-
ship”.43 
While the validity of the specific criticisms cannot 
be addressed in detail here, a brief review of relevant 
indices provides context. The democracy status indi-
cator of the Bertelsmann Transformation Atlas, for 
example, indicates a decline between 2018 and 2020 
(6.8 to 6.6), although both years are noticeably better 
than 2010 (6.05). Rule of law shows an improvement 
from 5.5 (2010) to 6.3 (2020), although again with a 
slightly negative recent trend (2016 and 2018: 6.5).44 
The Liberal Democracy Index of the Varieties of 
Democracy (V-Dem) project and the EIU’s Democracy 
Index show similar findings. The former registers an 
improvement between 2010 and 2019 (from 0.33 to 
0.5), but a decline since 2015 (0.61).45 For rule of law 
the figures for 2010 and 2019 are identical (0.81), 
with a fall since 2018 (0.85).46 The EIU’s Democracy 
Index also indicates improvement from 2010 to 2019 
(4.59 vs. 5.42), although the figure for 2019 is thus 
lower than those for 2013 (5.95), 2017 and 2016 (both 
5.93).47 Although there are naturally limits to the use-
fulness of such heavily aggregated indicators, they 
do suggest an identifiable general trend: There have 
indeed been setbacks in democracy and rule of law 
during Georgian Dream’s second term, although these 
have not to date been so grave as to reverse the posi-
tive developments since 2012. 
The critical letters from Washington are notable 
for several reasons. Firstly they indicate at least a blip 
in Congress’s narrative about and towards Georgia. 
Bipartisan goodwill in Congress had hitherto been a 
 
43 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
“Risch, Shaheen Express Concern for Potential Backsliding 
of Georgian Democracy and Governance”, press release, 
29 January 2020, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/ 
chair/release/risch-shaheen-express-concern-for-potential-
backsliding-of-georgian-democracy-and-governance (accessed 
12 August 2020). 
44 Bertelsmann Transformation Atlas, “Democracy Status: 
Georgia. 2010–2020”, 2020, https://atlas.bti-project.org/ 
share.php?1*2020*CV:CTC:SELAFG*CAT*AFG*REG:TAB. 
45 A slight improvement from 0.53 to 0.56 occurred be-
tween 2017 and 2018, but that does not alter the broader 
trend since 2015. 
46 Varieties of Democracy, “Country Graph: Georgia”, 
6 September 2020, https://www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/ 
CountryGraph/. 
47 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Democracy Index 2019: 
A Year of Democratic Setbacks and Popular Protest (London et al., 
2020), 18. 
central trope of Georgian-American relations, and 
an important constant through changing adminis-
trations. This consensus, which had been driven in 
particular by Georgia’s democratic development, 
seems to be more fragile than it had appeared. It 
remains to be seen whether this divergence is more 
than transient. But the critics are clearly not light-
weights.48 Connolly and Kinzinger in particular 
actually stood for a further deepening of American-
Georgian relations, and both – Connolly espe-
cially – played decisive roles in shepherding the 
Georgia Support Act through the House of Represen-
tatives on 22 October 2019, in other words just a few 
weeks prior to their letters. The Act, if adopted, will 
make it US policy to “support Georgia’s sovereignty, 
independence, and territorial integrity”49 through 
measures including enhanced security and defence 
cooperation. The Georgian embassy in Washington 
hailed the Act as “historic”.50 
It should also be noted that Congress’s influence 
on foreign policy has grown. One reason for this was 
the incoherence of the Trump White House and the 
sidelining of the State Department – which can also 
to an extent be regarded as a result of Trump’s poli-
tics. Congress’s foreign policy repertoire includes im-
posing sanctions and allocating budget funds to par-
ticular countries. This could have positive or negative 
implications for Georgia. Donald Trump initially pro-
posed cutting US funding for Georgia, but Congress 
prevented this. The draft bill on appropriations for 
foreign aid for fiscal year 2021, as passed by the House 
of Representatives, does include a provision that the 
disbursement of 15 percent of the $132 million ear-
marked for Georgia is conditional on progress with 
democratic institutions, the fight against corruption 
and the rule of law. That clause is lacking in the ver-
sion approved by the Senate’s Appropriations Com-
 
48 As well as the named cases, other members of Congress 
also wrote critical letters; in some cases, though, they also 
appear to have been pursuing particular interests. See the 
section “Strategic Partnership as Washington’s Gateway to 
Eurasia” in this publication. 
49 Georgia Support Act, H.R. 598, 116th Cong. (2019–20), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/ 
598/text (accessed 3 December 2020). 
50 The Embassy of Georgia to the United States of America, 
“US House of Representatives Passes Georgia Support Act”, 
press release, 22 October 2019, http://georgiaembassyusa.org/ 
2019/10/22/us-house-of-representatives-passes-georgia-
support-act/ (accessed 12 August 2020). In December 2020, 
Senate approval was still pending.  
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mittee. The bill still needs final Senate approval and 
must be signed into law by the President.51 It remains 
to be seen whether members of Congress are serious 
about putting the Strategic Partnership on the line on 
account of a perceived gap between expectation and 
reality, or whether this is simply a rhetorical device 
to lend weight to their calls for democratic reforms.52 
 
51 Joshua Kucera, “Georgia: Trump Administration Boost-
ing Military Aid”, Eurasianet, 14 November 2017, https:// 
eurasianet.org/georgia-trump-administration-boosting-
military-aid (accessed 13 August 2020); State, Foreign Opera-
tions, Agriculture, Rural Development, Interior, Environment, Mili-
tary Construction, and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 
2021 (Washington, D.C., 30 July 2020), 239f., https://www. 
congress.gov/116/bills/hr7608/BILLS-116hr7608rfs.pdf 
(accessed 9 October 2020). 
52 Tbilisi cannot have been entirely surprised by the public 
criticism from Washington in winter 2019/20, nor was it re-
stricted to Congress. The state of Georgia’s democracy was 
reportedly also discussed at the meeting between Prime Min-
ister Bakhtadze and US Secretary of State Pompeo in summer 
2019, as well as during the autumn 2019 visit to Washington 
Image Issues: Projection versus Reception 
There is a degree of “image dissonance”,53 at least in 
the area of democracy and governance. The image 
that the Georgian government conveys – or would 
like to convey – does not come over as completely 
convincing in Washington. Such divergences are 
 
by Georgian Defence Minister Irakli Gharibashvili. The U.S. 
Department of State’s Georgia 2019 Human Rights Report pub-
lished in March 2020 also notes deficits in judicial independ-
ence and restrictions on the right of assembly. U.S. Depart-
ment of State, Georgia 2019 Human Rights Report (Washington, 
D.C., March 2020), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/ 
2020/03/GEORGIA-2019-HUMAN-RIGHTS-REPORT.pdf. 
53 Ben D. Mor, “Credibility Talk in Public Diplomacy”, 
Review of International Studies 38, no. 2 (2012): 393–422 (394). 
Here it should also be mentioned that America’s own image 
has suffered under Donald Trump. Most recently circum-
stances of the almost simultaneous elections in the United 
States and Georgia led some US Georgia experts to question 
Washington’s credibility in commenting on the conduct of 
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nothing new. Washington’s decision to create the 
Strategic Partnership in the first place is attributed to 
democratic deficits during Saakashvili’s presidency, 
or as a response to them. It is therefore not entirely 
credible when the UNM and the former parliamen-
tary opposition politically instrumentalise the criti-
cisms.54 The scepticism expressed in Washington and 
the treatment of Georgian Dream do, however, sug-
gest that the government finds it hard, or at least 
harder than its predecessor, to establish its own inter-
pretation of particular events and developments in 
Washington.55 
Washington is not completely 
convinced by the image Georgia 
conveys – or would like to convey. 
One reason for the divergences with the US Con-
gress, representatives of the Georgian governing party 
argue, is misinformation, which they attribute above 
all to activities of the Georgian political opposition in 
Washington.56 It is quite possible that the opposition 
does continue to maintain good contacts in US politi-
cal circles and also employs them for its own ends, in 
other words against the Georgian Dream government. 
Critical NGOs with contacts to institutions in the 
United States likely also play a role. On the other 
hand it is apparent that Georgian Dream is less suc-
cessful at establishing rapport in Washington. Be-
tween December 2019 and February 2020 – in the 
period immediately before the imposition of inter-
national travel restrictions in response to the Covid-
19 pandemic – a string of leading figures flew to 
Washington to rectify the presumed information 
deficit: the deputy speaker of parliament and the sec-
retary-general of Georgian Dream (December 2019), 
the speaker of parliament (February 2020) and the 
foreign minister (February 2020). Like the United 
 
54 The United National Movement split in early 2017, 
when a group of deputies broke away to found the Move-
ment for Liberty – European Georgia. 
55 The reactions also demonstrate that the Georgian leader-
ship is indeed sensitive to criticism from Washington. Frank 
Schimmelfennig, “Goffman Meets IR: Dramaturgical Action 
in International Community”, International Review of Sociology 
12, no. 3 (2002): 417–37.  
56 Zaal Anjaparidze, “Impact of Western Support and Rep-
rimand on Georgian Politics”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 17, no. 25 
(24 February 2020), https://jamestown.org/program/impact-of-
western-support-and-reprimand-on-georgian-politics/ (accessed 
12 August 2020). 
National Movement before it, Georgian Dream also 
engaged PR firms to conduct “impression manage-
ment” in Washington.57 In spring 2020 it hired Hogan 
Lovells and DCI Group to step up such activities. As 
laid out in the contract, DCI Group’s remit was to 
“promote Georgian Dream as a reliable and pragmatic 
partner for democracy, peace and stability with un-
wavering commitment to Western democratic liberal 
ideals and the special Georgia-U.S. relationship”.58 
Altogether the party spent about $1.2 million on lob-
bying services. Its contract with Hogan Lovells runs 
until the end of January 2021, the one with DCI Group 
ended on 31 October 2020, the date of the first round 
of the Georgian parliamentary elections. 
Despite these PR activities, the party’s founder 
and current leader Bidzina Ivanishvili receives an un-
favourable mention in a report published on 10 June 
2020 by the Republican Study Committee, a caucus of 
conservatives in the House of Representatives. On the 
one hand, the document, which was written as a guide 
for Congress on national security and foreign policy, 
describes Georgia as a “democratic U.S. ally” and rec-
ommends expanding security and defence coopera-
tion and enacting the Georgia Support Act. Elsewhere, 
however, Ivanishvili is mentioned in the context 
of US sanctions against associates of Vladimir Putin: 
“Bidzina Ivanishvili, the richest man in Georgia, is 
a close ally of Putin and involved in destabilizing 
Georgia on Russia’s behalf.”59 The reference to Iva-
 
57 In 2019 the Georgian government concluded or renewed 
contracts for political lobbying in Washington with the PR 
firms Chartwell Strategy Group, StrateVarious LLC and Hill+ 
Knowlton Strategies; the total spend was reportedly close 
to $3 million. “Government Hires New Company for U.S. 
Lobbying”, Civil.ge (online), 8 April 2019, https://civil.ge/ 
archives/301452 (accessed 12 August 2020); Thomas Moore, 
“Two Public Affairs Firms Hired by Country of Georgia”, 
prweek.com (online), 11 February 2019, https://www.prweek. 
com/article/1525455/two-public-affairs-firms-hired-country-
georgia (accessed 12 August 2020). 
58 U.S. Department of Justice, Exhibit A to Registration State-
ment (Washington, D.C., 12 February 2020), https://efile.fara. 
gov/docs/6278-Exhibit-AB-20200212-16.pdf (accessed 12 
August 2020). For the contract with Hogan Lovells see idem, 
Exhibit A to Registration Statement (Washington, D.C., 8 Febru-
ary 2020), https://efile.fara.gov/docs/2244-Exhibit-AB-2020 
0208-90.pdf (accessed 12 August 2020). 
59 Republican Study Committee’s Task Force on National 
Security and Foreign Affairs, Strengthening America and Coun-
tering Global Threats: The RSC National Security Strategy (Washing-
ton, D.C., 10 June 2020), 34, 36, https://rsc-johnson.house. 
gov/sites/republicanstudycommittee.house.gov/files/%5BFINA
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nishvili indicates first of all that even eight years after 
Georgian Dream’s 2012 election victory he still suffers 
a dubious image in Washington; as well as his ten-
dency to operate behind the scenes, his earlier busi-
ness career in Russia is often mentioned. While 
observers in Washington point out that Ivanishvili 
himself has never made an official visit to the United 
States, his opportunities to do so were actually lim-
ited: he only occupied an official function for a little 
more than a year, serving as prime minister from 
October 2012 to November 2013. Adding to the irri-
tation, in a television interview in late 2019 Ivanish-
vili made critical comments about the activities of 
US-funded democracy promoters in Georgia, where 
he specifically named the International Republican 
Institute and the National Democratic Institute. 
Another challenge for Georgian Dream is that over 
time many explicitly transatlantic-leaning figures 
in its own ranks, with good contacts in Washington, 
have stepped down from active roles in the party 
and/or the government. The end of the governing 
coalition’s first term in 2016 saw a string of pro-West-
ern figures leave the political stage, especially in 
association with the departure of the Free Democrats 
and the Republican Party. Following the failure in 
late 2019 to pass the electoral reform another group 
of deputies who were known for their interest in for-
eign policy and Euro-Atlantic leanings left the party 
in protest. 
Contradictory Role Conceptions 
Georgia still boasts a commendable democratic record 
in regional comparison. The developments outlined 
above do, however, indicate that – as already under 
Saakashvili – the issues of democracy, rule of law 
and good governance also present pitfalls for the cur-
rent Georgian leadership when it comes to justifying 
Georgia’s “strategic significance” for the United States 
and deepening the Strategic Partnership. 
 
L%5D%20NSTF%20Report.pdf (accessed 13 August 2020). On 
the discussion about the document’s significance in and for 
Georgia, see also “RSC Report Receives Mixed Reaction in 
Georgia”, Netgazeti, 12 June 2020 (via BBC Monitoring Caucasus, 
16 June 2020). 
Tbilisi strives to expand the Strategic 
Partnership beyond questions of 
democracy and rule of law. 
The reason for this is that in these areas the domes-
tic and external roles, role expectations and behav-
ioural norms do not always coincide. The national 
sphere is where political actors are principally social-
ised, roles are shaped, and important political offices 
distributed; in other words, this is where the motives 
are primarily located.60 The Saakashvili government 
already had to deal with role conflicts created by its 
increasingly authoritarian course.61 The current leader-
ship under Georgian Dream is also attempting to 
avoid or manage role conflicts. For example it is seek-
ing to flesh out the Strategic Partnership – above and 
beyond questions of democracy and rule of law – 
to enrich the shared Georgian-American agenda with 
“its own” themes or to highlight particular issues. 
Under Georgian Dream the area of defence and secu-
rity remains a suitable and central field for this from 
the Georgian perspective. 
Strategic Partnership as Risk-Sharing 
Security and defence cooperation continues to play 
an outstanding role in Georgian-American relations. 
It remains embedded in the broader context of NATO-
Georgia-relations, but extends a good deal further 
than the bilateral cooperation with other NATO mem-
bers. Already under Saakashvili Georgia’s understand-
ing of its role vis-à-vis the United States extended well 
beyond the Bush administration’s democratisation 
agenda. Tbilisi also sought to position itself as a de-
pendable partner in the security sphere. One impor-
tant component here was the participation of Geor-
gian troops in US-led operations. Especially after the 
2008 August War this was intended to communicate 
that Georgia was not just a security consumer but had 
its own positive contribution to make to international 
 
60 Schimmelfennig, “Goffman Meets IR” (see note 55), 420. 
61 Nilsson, “Role Conceptions, Crises, and Georgia’s For-
eign Policy” (see note 9). As his democratic image crumbled, 
Saakashvili increasingly turned to anti-Russian attitudes 
among US Republicans as the basis for the bilateral relation-
ship. Lincoln Mitchell, Neutrality for Georgia: A Possible View from 
Washington (Vienna: Institut für Sicherheitspolitik, 7 Decem-
ber 2019), https://www.institutfuersicherheit.at/neutrality-of-
georgia-a-possible-view-from-washington/ (accessed 15 Sep-
tember 2020). 
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security.62 Georgian Dream continued this practice. 
For example then Prime Minister Bakhtadze said in a 
joint press statement with Secretary of State Pompeo 
in summer 2019: “Georgia is America’s loyal partner 
in [sic] the global stage. Our friendship is time-tested 
and our bonds are forged in combat.”63 
On the one hand the Trump administration’s 
agenda was less ideological and thus also less co-
herent than Bush’s had been. Its messaging to exter-
nal partners on role expectations was therefore like-
wise less clear. On the other hand Donald Trump’s 
transactional style of politics offered opportunities for 
Georgia to further deepen cooperation, especially in 
the sphere of security. Tbilisi’s official statements on 
the Strategic Partnership and on relations with the 
United States reveal how it sought to use the trans-
actional approach for its own ends. One new topos 
in the Georgian narrative in recent years has been the 
matter of Georgia’s contribution to military burden-
sharing. As then Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili 
put it in May 2018: “Georgia honors its part of the 
partnership bargain by fighting alongside America 
and its NATO allies in hotspots like Iraq and Afghani-
stan, where Georgia has suffered more casualties 
per capita than any NATO country except the United 
States. Georgia’s spending on defense well exceeds 
NATO’s two percent standard, as President Trump has 
rightly insisted on. We are proud to do so, and to sup-
port our common security agenda.”64 This statement 
illustrates how the trope of “fulfilling the 2 percent 
target for defence spending” builds on existing ele-
ments of the Georgian narrative, such as Tbilisi’s 
contributions to US-led international operations, the 
shared sacrifices these involve, and the numerically 
disproportionate involvement of Georgian troops. 
 
62 According to interviewees in Washington, Georgia’s 
support in Afghanistan was appreciated, but under President 
Obama there were also questions concerning what Georgia 
might expect in return. 
63 U.S. Department of State, “Statements to the Press with 
Georgian Prime Minister Mamuka Bakhtadze as Part of 
the U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission”, press 
release, Washington, D.C., 11 June 2019, https://www.state. 
gov/statements-to-the-press-with-georgian-prime-minister-
mamuka-bakhtadze-as-part-of-the-u-s-georgia-strategic-
partnership-commission/ (accessed 13 August 2020). 
64 Government of Georgia, “Remarks by Prime Minister 
Giorgi Kvirikashvili at the USIP Second Annual U.S.-Georgia 
Strategic Partnership Conference”, 23 May 2018, http:// 
gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=497&info_id=65821 
(accessed 14 August 2020). 
Washington for its part has rapidly expanded the 
language on Georgia’s security engagement and 
on cooperation under the Strategic Partnership.65 
Further Intensification and 
Strategic Realignment 
While it would be an oversimplification to attribute 
the development of American-Georgian security and 
defence cooperation directly to the expansion of the 
Georgian narrative, the process does illustrate how 
the relationship has continued to deepen. The perfor-
mative construction of Georgia as Washington’s de-
pendable security partner described above is, how-
ever, just one aspect of the evolution of the coopera-
tion. The central elements are in particular the well-
established personal networks, the shared experience 
of fighting in Afghanistan and a traditionally pro-
Georgian attitude in the Pentagon, especially under 
a Republican administration.66 
From the Georgian perspective the purchase of 
Javelin anti-tank-missiles, which finally went through 
under Trump, represented a significant step towards 
deeper cooperation. Tbilisi had requested the sale 
under Obama but Washington declined to approve it, 
having suspended arms sales after the August War.67 
The deal Trump approved was accompanied by a fun-
damental turn in security and defence cooperation. 
Earlier US military support had concentrated above 
all on training Georgian troops for international 
deployments, counter-insurgency and counter-terror-
ism; interoperability with NATO standards; and 
reform of the defence sector. Now support is explicitly 
also to be directed to territorial defence capabilities. 
The Georgian Defense Readiness Program (GDRP) in-
 
65 For an example see U.S. Department of Defense, “Re-
marks at Bilateral Meeting with Georgian Minister of Defense 
Izoria: Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense James 
Mattis”, Washington, D.C., 13 November 2017, https://www. 
defense.gov/Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/1370696/rem
arks-a%20-meeting-with-georgian-minister-of-defense-izoria/ 
(accessed 12 August 2020). 
66 Cooley and Nexon, “Interpersonal Networks and Inter-
national Security” (see note 21). 
67 Michael Cecire, “U.S.-Georgia Defense Talks Leave 
Tbilisi Smiling”, World Politics Review, 27 February 2012; Welt, 
How Strategic Is the US-Georgia Strategic Partnership? (see note 
34), 7–9; Michael Cecire, “The Rewards and Risks of the U.S. 
Providing Georgia with Advanced Anti-Tank Arms”, World 
Politics Review, 12 January 2018. 
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cludes such a priority,68 under which Georgian forces 
have been trained for an invasion scenario since May 
2018. The groundwork for the programme had been 
laid in 2016, when Obama was still president. It re-
flects the Obama administration’s new perspective on 
Russia and the Caucasus in his second term, in light 
of events in and around Ukraine. In the United States 
Russia now became widely regarded as the greatest 
strategic challenge again.69 The basis for this inten-
sification of cooperation between Georgia and the 
United States was a Memorandum on Deepening 
the Defense and Security Partnership, signed by then 
Georgian Prime Minister Kvirikashvili and then US 
Secretary of State Kerry. But it was during the Trump 
administration that this form of cooperation really 
 
68 Robert E. Hamilton, August 2008 and Everything After: 
A Ten-Year Retrospective on the Russia-Georgia War, Black Sea 
Strategy Papers (Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Insti-
tute [FPRI], October 2018), 13; Welt, How Strategic Is the US-
Georgia Strategic Partnership? (see note 34), 16–18. As Dzebi-
sashvili notes, until then training and education had been 
uppermost, both in the conceptualisation and in the fund-
ing; Dzebisashvili, Transforming Defence (see note 18), 259. 
69 Hamilton, August 2008 and Everything After (see note 68), 
25, 31; Toal, Near Abroad (see note 4), 275. 
gained momentum.70 Intelligence sharing between 
Tbilisi and Washington also expanded under Trump, 
on the basis of the U.S.-Georgia General Security of 
Information Agreement signed in 2017, which was 
also designed to strengthen counter-terrorism co-
operation.71 The two regular US-led military exercises 
in Georgia – Agile Spirit (since 2011) and Noble Part-
ner (since 2015) – bring in other NATO and non-
NATO partners and have also evolved. 
 
70 Kucera, “Georgia: Trump Administration Boosting 
Military Aid” (see note 51); Joshua Kucera, “U.S. Shifting 
Military Aid to Georgia to Help It Fight at Home”, Eurasianet, 
7 July 2016, https://eurasianet.org/us-shifting-military-aid-
georgia-help-it-fight-home (accessed 1 October 2020); Gege-
shidze, Contemporary Georgian-American Relations (see note 6), 
16. The GDRP comprises two components, GDRP-Training 
and GDRP-Institutional. 
71 “United States, Georgia Sign General Security of Infor-
mation Agreement”, Civil.ge (online), 9 May 2017, 
https://civil.ge/archives/126384 (accessed 12 August 2020). 
Georgia and NATO: The Story Since 2008 
The United States has been a driving force behind the deepen-
ing of cooperation between Georgia and NATO in recent years. 
Under Trump various high-ranking government representatives 
have underlined the option of Georgia joining NATO, including 
Vice President Mike Pence during his state visit in summer 2017. 
But given that it still lacks a Membership Action Plan and a con-




The 2014 NATO summit in Cardiff, which took place against 
the backdrop of the conflict in and around Ukraine and Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea, represented an important milestone in 
NATO-Georgia relations, although below the threshold of an 
MAP. What Georgia did achieve at the summit was recognition 
as an Enhanced Opportunities Partner, a status enjoyed other-
wise only by Sweden, Finland, Australia, Jordan, and since June 
2020 also Ukraine. It grants these countries options for deeper 
cooperation with NATO. The Substantial NATO-Georgia Package 
(SNGP) was also approved in Cardiff. Initially it contained stra-
tegic, tactical and operational measures in thirteen areas designed 
to strengthen Georgia’s defence capabilities and interoperability 
with NATO. One aspect of the SNGP was the establishment of 
two new institutions in Georgia, the Joint Training and Evalu-
ation Centre (JTEC) and the Defence Institution Building School. 
The SNGP also provides for support in fields like cyber-defence,  
 strategic planning and strategic communications.
b 
The first 
NATO-Georgia exercise under the SNGP was held in 2016, the 
second in March 2019. The SNGP is being implemented succes-
sively. In October 2019 the NATO member states and Georgia 
agreed a comprehensive update. At its Foreign Ministerial on 
2 December 2020, NATO approved an SNGP Refresh, adding 
new components and expanding existing ones. 
a The White House, “Remarks by the Vice President and 
Georgian Prime Minister in a Joint Press Conference”, press 
release, Washington, D.C., 1 August 2017, https://www. 
whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-vice-president-
georgian-prime-minister-joint-press-conference/ (accessed 
12 August 2020). 
b North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Substantial NATO-
Georgia Package (SNGP): Factsheet”, 13 August 2020, https:// 
www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_02/2016
0303_160209-factsheet-sngp-full-eng.pdf. Sceptics note that 
the SNGP lacks the necessary NATO resources, and that this 
undermines its credibility. Tracey German, “NATO and the 
Enlargement Debate: Enhancing Euro-Atlantic Security or 
Inciting Confrontation?” International Affairs 93, no. 2 
(2017): 291–308 (302). 
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For Tbilisi defence and security 
cooperation underlines the close 
partnership with the United States 
and Georgia’s place in “the West”. 
Intensifying cooperation appears to offer added 
value for both sides. For the Georgians defence and 
security cooperation in particular underlines their 
close partnership with the United States and their 
place in “the West”. Alongside the practical aspect 
of enhancing (defence) capacities, “More USA in 
Georgia” therefore also has symbolic meaning – 
similar to Tbilisi’s “More EU in Georgia”.72 For Wash-
ington, and especially the Pentagon, closer coopera-
tion represents a contribution to containing Russia’s 
geopolitical ambitions. It also permits Washington 
to signal continuing US influence at comparably little 
cost. Helping partner nations to expand their own 
capacities also serves the credo of burden-sharing. 
As one interviewed US official put it, the point is to 
make Georgia a country the United States can train 
with, rather than a country it trains.73 
Closer bilateral cooperation in the area of security 
and defence is linked to and broadly embedded in the 
cooperation between Georgia and NATO, which has 
also expanded in recent years. But it does not auto-
matically bring Georgia any closer to NATO member-
ship, nor will it necessarily even lead to a Member-
ship Action Plan. Even if the Charter on Strategic Part-
nership states that the “program of enhanced security 
cooperation [is] intended to increase Georgian capabil-
ities and to strengthen Georgia’s candidacy for NATO 
membership”, joining NATO is not currently on the 
 
72 See also Ministry of Defence of Georgia, National Security 
Concept of Georgia (Tbilisi, 2018), https://mod.gov.ge/uploads/ 
2018/pdf/NSC-ENG.pdf (accessed 13 August 2020); idem, 
National Military Strategy (Tbilisi, 2014), https://mod.gov.ge/ 
uploads/2018/pdf/NMS-ENG.pdf (accessed 14 August 2020). 
73 Tim Kreuttner et al., “A Joint and Operational Approach 
for Security Assistance to Georgia and Ukraine”, Military 
Review, March–April 2018, 118–28. See also U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy 
of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s 
Competitive Edge (Washington, D.C.) https://dod.defense.gov/ 
Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-
Summary.pdf (accessed 12 August 2020); White House, 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Wash-
ington, D.C., December 2017), https://www.whitehouse. 
gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-
0905.pdf (accessed 12 August 2020). 
agenda.74 Of this both sides are aware. Instead, en-
hanced bilateral security cooperation can be seen 
until further notice as an alternative to NATO member-
ship.75 In the case of territorial defence, for example, 
bilateral US-Georgia cooperation extends considerably 
further than the multilateral cooperation between 
NATO and Georgia.76 
Two Faces of Security Policy 
The security cooperation and the orientation on Geor-
gia’s territorial defence of recent years both reflect 
and amplify a specific one-sidedness in Washington’s 
security engagement in the region. The United States 
still participates in the Geneva International Discus-
sions initiated after the August War to enable regular 
exchange between representatives of Georgia, Abkha-
zia and South Ossetia. Russia is also involved. Con-
fidence-building and humanitarian measures in this 
context do figure in the Strategic Partnership, under 
people-to-people and cultural exchanges,77 but in the 
core area of security and defence the conflicts and 
breakaway regions are discussed above all in the con-
text of Russian transgressions. The growing emphasis 
on territorial defence makes it even harder for Wash-
ington to compartmentalise its engagement in the 
Geneva International Discussions from the bilateral 
relationship. 
The Ukraine crisis in particular led to a shift in US 
terminology: Previously the more neutral “protracted 
conflicts” and the more partial “occupied territories” 
were both in use. Now the latter term appears to have 
become established. This is certainly not the first or 
 
74 U.S. Department of State, United States-Georgia Charter 
(see note 35). 
75 Vladimir Socor, “Georgia Plans Its ‘To Do’ Agenda for 
NATO”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 15, no. 120 (9 August 2018), 
https://jamestown.org/program/georgia-plans-its-to-do-agenda-
for-nato (accessed 14 August 2020). 
76 Vladimir Socor, “The United States Does the Heavy Lift-
ing for NATO in Georgia”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 15, no. 119 
(8 August 2018) 119, https://jamestown.org/program/the-
united-states-does-the-heavy-lifting-for-nato-in-georgia/ 
(accessed 13 August 2020). 
77 See for example U.S. Department of State, “Joint State-
ment of the 2017 U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership Commis-
sion Working Group on People-to-People and Cultural Ex-
changes”, press release, Washington, D.C., 22 December 2017, 
https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-of-the-2017-u-s-georgia-
strategic-partnership-commission-working-group-on-people-
to-people-and-cultural-exchanges/ (accessed 14 August 2020). 
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only instance where the United States has abandoned 
the position of “honest broker”. Western pronounce-
ments of support for Georgia’s territorial integrity 
and sovereignty, as it was already framed in Saakash-
vili’s time, were hardly compatible with the role of a 
neutral mediator.78 In the early years of the Strategic 
Partnership American experts on Georgia – Lincoln 
Mitchell and Alexander Cooley and their colleagues 
Samuel Charap and Cory Welt – recommended that 
Washington should develop its own strategy towards 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, independent of Tbilisi’s 
policy towards its breakaway regions.79 Ten years later 
there is virtually no sign of this. Instead decisions 
of recent years demonstrate that Washington’s and 
Tbilisi’s positions converge, especially where Abkha-
zia and South Ossetia are concerned.80 
Strategic Partnership as Washington’s 
Gateway to Eurasia 
Alongside security and defence, Georgia is increasingly 
seeking to strengthen economic and trade coopera-
tion in the Strategic Partnership. To this end Tbilisi is 
promoting the idea of an economic corridor between 
Asia and Europe, in which it sees Georgia playing a 
key role. In this guise, the idea that Georgia could 
serve as an economic hub connecting European and 
Asian markets has thus found its way into the Stra-
tegic Partnership. Tbilisi is seeking to adapt the Part-
nership’s agenda accordingly by upgrading the eco-
nomic dimension. The concept of an economic hub 
is by no means restricted to the bilateral American-
Georgian cooperation in the Strategic Partnership, 
nor are its origins to be found there.81 Instead, official 
 
78 Cooley and Mitchell, “No Way to Treat Our Friends” 
(see note 15), 31; Mitchell and Cooley, After the August 
War (see note 15), 25. 
79 Mitchell and Cooley, After the August War (see note 15), 
32; Samuel Charap and Cory Welt, A New Approach to the 
Russia-Georgia Conflict: The United States Needs a Comprehensive 
Conflict Policy (Washington D.C.: Center for American Pro-
gress, 18 October 2010), https://www.americanprogress.org/ 
issues/security/news/2010/10/18/8501/a-new-approach-to-the-
russia-georgia-conflict/ (accessed 10 October 2020). 
80 Urban Jaksa, Interpreting Non-Recognition in De Facto States 
Engagement: The Case of Abkhazia’s Foreign Relations, Ph.D. diss., 
University of York, May 2019, 220. 
81 See for example Franziska Smolnik, Georgia Positions Itself 
on China’s New Silk Road, SWP Comment 13/2018 (Berlin: Stif-
tung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2018). 
Georgian pronouncements demonstrate that Tbilisi is 
now pushing this policy in the bilateral forum while 
it has in fact been in circulation for some years. State-
ments by then Prime Minister Mamuka Bakhtadze 
at the June 2019 meeting of the Strategic Partnership 
Commission illustrate this: “Georgia provides a unique 
gateway where American companies can conveniently 
and quickly reach European and Asian growing mar-
kets. We hope that our strategic partnership with the 
United States will lead us to a unique model of trade 
cooperation. This will be a next logical step that will 
open enormous opportunities for the American busi-
ness interests in our region.” The point of the exercise 
is to expand cooperation to the economic sphere and 
attract American investment: “Georgia is open for 
business and we welcome our American friends to see 
the opportunities that are existing in Georgia. We 
want more investment, more trade, and more of the 
U.S. in Georgia”.82 
In fact trade with the United States is small in 
comparison with the European Union; the latter is 
Georgia’s largest trade partner, connected through an 
Association Agreement and a Deep and Comprehen-
sive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). In 2019 Georgia imported 
goods worth almost $680 million from the United 
States, while Georgian exports to the United States 
amounted to just over $130 million. US exports to 
Georgia account for less than 0.05 percent of total US 
exports – and imports a miniscule 0.006 percent of 
the US total. From the Georgian perspective, the United 
States accounts for 3.5 percent of its exports and 7.1 
percent of its imports. Trade diversification is weak: 
in 2018 iron and steel accounted for more than 90 per-
cent of Georgia’s exports to the United States, while 
85 percent of its imports from the United States was 
machinery and transport equipment.83 Georgian-
American trade thus fits into the general picture of 
Georgian foreign trade: a trade deficit and exports 
dominated by unprocessed goods. 
Tbilisi believes that one promising way to deepen 
trade relations would be to concretise the long-dis-
cussed idea of a US-Georgia free trade agreement.84 
 
82 U.S. Department of State, “Statements to the Press with 
Georgian Prime Minister Mamuka Bakhtadze” (see note 63). 
83 UNCTADSTAT, http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/. 
84 See for example the Fox News opinion piece by the then 
prime minister: Giorgi Kvirikashvili, “Georgia Prime Minis-
ter: US-Georgia Trade Deal Would Create US Jobs, Improve 
Energy Security”, Fox News (online), 23 May 2018, https:// 
www.foxnews.com/opinion/georgia-prime-minister-us-
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The discussion dates back to the Saakashvili era, and 
has also been conducted since 2012 in the framework 
of the U.S.-Georgia High-Level Dialogue on Trade and 
Investment. Now it surfaces again in the context of 
the hub concept, which is taking shape in the guise 
of a web of free trade agreements. Georgia has signed 
FTAs with China, the European Union and the mem-
bers of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 
among others. But the American-Georgian free trade 
process never seems to move beyond declarations of 
intent – despite the Georgia Support Act calling for 
progress and the signing of a memorandum of under-
standing on cooperation to enhance bilateral trade 
relations in summer 2019. A breakthrough remains a 
remote prospect. 
Tbilisi employs narrative elements that have been 
in circulation since the Saakashvili era to underline 
its desire to deepen economic relations. These include 
Georgia’s low taxes, lean bureaucracy and favourable 
investment and business environment, as evidenced 
 
georgia-trade-deal-would-create-us-jobs-improve-energy-
security (accessed 14 August 2020). 
by indices such as the World Bank’s Ease of Doing 
Business.85 However, the fate of the deepwater port 
at Anaklia – an erstwhile prestige project in the hub 
context – leaves these arguments sounding less con-
vincing to American ears.86 
 
85 See for example The Embassy of Georgia to the United 
States, “Georgia-US Strategic Partnership 2018 – All-Time-
High”, press release, 2 March 2019, https://georgiaembassy 
usa.org/2019/03/02/georgia-us-strategic-partnership-2018% 
E2%80%8A-%E2%80%8Aall-time-high/ (accessed 14 August 
2020). 
86 In early 2020 the Georgian government engaged the 
US lobbying firm Chartwell Strategy Group to strengthen 
bilateral trade relations and US investment in Georgia. 
Chartwell had already been working for Tbilisi since 2018 
to deepen mutual cooperation. U.S. Department of Justice, 
https://efile.fara.gov/ords/f?p=181:200:0::NO:RP,200:P200_ 
REG_NUMBER,P200_DOC_TYPE,P200_COUNTRY:6518,Exhibit+ 
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The Anaklia Affair 
For a long time Tbilisi’s plan to create a new deep-
water port at Anaklia played a central role in its 
concept of an international transit and logistics hub. 
This gigantic infrastructure project was to comple-
ment Georgia’s existing but less deep Black Sea ports. 
Tbilisi regarded it as a central component of the pro-
posed east-west corridor connecting Chinese and 
European markets via Georgia.87 Construction began 
in December 2017, with phase one operations origi-
nally planned to begin at the end of 2020. The con-
tract for the “project of the century” was awarded 
in 2016 to a Georgian-American joint venture, the 
Anaklia Development Consortium (ADC). Tbilisi her-
alded the participation of a US corporation as evi-
 
87 An excellent overview of the project and its (lack of) 
progress can be found in Tekla Aslanishvili and Orit Hal-
pern, “Scenes from a Reclamation”, e-flux Architecture, New 
Silk Roads project, 10 February 2020, https://www.e-flux.com/ 
architecture/new-silk-roads/313102/scenes-from-a-reclamation/ 
(accessed 14 August 2020). 
dence of Georgia’s Western credentials. Anaklia was 
also a priority in the Strategic Partnership. It still is – 
but the connotation has changed dramatically since 
2019, after the project became embroiled in scandal 
and political controversy. Most prominently, the 
founders of the TBC Bank, the Georgian partner in 
the ADC,88 were accused of money-laundering. There 
was also discord over Tbilisi’s refusal to issue credit 
guarantees for the project. The American Conti Group 
withdrew from the project in summer 2019, appar-
ently in response to the irregularities. In January 2020 
the Georgian government finally terminated its con-
tract with the Anaklia Development Consortium, 
after the latter failed to acquire sufficient capital for 
the project by the end of 2019.89 At least officially, the 
 
88 TBC founder Mamuka Khazaradze subsequently founded 
his own political party, Lelo, which participated in the par-
liamentary elections in October 2020.  
89 Giorgi Lomsadze, “Georgia Cancels Contract for Black 
Sea Megaport”, Eurasianet, 9 January 2020, https://eurasianet. 
org/georgia-cancels-contract-for-black-sea-mega port (accessed 
14 August 2020); “Georgian Government to Announce New 
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Georgian government is pressing ahead with the 
project. But its future is uncertain. 
The negotiations and disagreements over the deep-
water port were accompanied by interventions from 
Washington. The project was also mentioned when 
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo met then Prime 
Minister Bakhtadze in summer 2019 in Washington. 
At the press conference Pompeo expressed his “hope 
that Georgia completes the port project” and warned 
against “falling prey to Russian or Chinese economic 
influence”.90 Anaklia was also mentioned critically 
in the letters sent to Georgia’s government in winter 
2019/20 by leading members of the US Congress. 
Anaklia is not the only case where American busi-
nesses have become embroiled in controversy with 
the Georgian government or local competitors, or 
affected by such disputes.91 Without heed to the 
specifics, US actors frequently sweepingly attribute 
such conflicts to a lack of fair competition or sup-
posedly widespread pro-Russian bias making it hard 
for US firms to gain a foothold in the Georgian mar-
ket. In fact one must differentiate. In some cases the 
criticisms appear to conceal particular interests of 
private-sector US actors. Where US businesses induce 
local political representatives to raise their interests 
on the international stage, these issues become tied 
to established geopolitical positions – probably in 
the hope that this would lend more force to their 
demands.92 Overall, however, one can conclude: While 
Tbilisi seeks to sell itself as an economic hub in its 
imagined geography, Washington prioritises – at 
least in its rhetoric – fair competition and rule of law. 
 
tor”, OC Media (online), 23 January 2020, https://oc-media.org/ 
georgian-government-to-announce-new-bidding-for-anaklia-
port-after-pulling-contract-with-investor/ (accessed 14 August 
2020). 
90 U.S. Department of State, “Statements to the Press with 
Georgian Prime Minister Mamuka Bakhtadze” (see note 63). 
91 Ken Stier, “Georgia: Backsliding on Rule of Law Is 
Damaging Investment Climate”, Eurasianet, 12 July 2020, 
https://eurasianet.org/georgia-backsliding-on-rule-of-law-is-
damaging-investment-climate (accessed 20 July 2020). 
92 This appears to have been the case with Frontera 
Resources. See Sopiko Japaridze, “An Investor Standoff in 
Georgia Brings Workers, US Congressmen into Conflict”, 
openDemocracy (online), 29 January 2020, https://www. 
opendemocracy.net/en/odr/investor-standoff-georgia-brings-
workers-us-congressmen-conflict/ (accessed 14 August 2020). 
Lack of “Strategic Vision” 
Georgia’s attempts to develop the Strategic Partner-
ship in its own interest frequently encounter limits in 
Washington’s lack of a strategic vision for the country 
and the region. In that sense the “partnership” is in 
fact only partially “strategic”. American documents 
and official statements do indicate that US engage-
ment in the region is intended to contain Russian 
(and increasingly also Chinese) influence, as laid out 
for example in the US National Defense Strategy. Stra-
tegic competition with China and Russia is also men-
tioned as a priority in the National Defense Authori-
zation Act for 2021, which was adopted by Congress 
in early December 2020.93 This orientation is also 
reflected in (draft) legislation relating to Georgia. As 
well as the Georgia Support Act, Georgia is mentioned 
in the Countering America’s Adversaries Through 
Sanctions Act of 2017, which imposes sanctions on 
Russia, Iran and North Korea.94 The John McCain 
National Defense Authorization Act of 2018 mentions 
the necessity to strengthen the ability of European 
partners – explicitly including Georgia – to deter 
Russian aggression.95 
US engagement is not embedded in a 
longer-term strategy. 
US engagement is not, however, embedded in a 
longer-term strategy. Interviewees in Tbilisi complain 
that Georgia is currently “not in the picture” in Wash-
ington. It might be more accurate to say that Washing-
ton simply does not have a comprehensive strategic 
plan for the region, and has not had one since the 
end of the Bush administration. Back then vital inter-
ests defined US policy towards the South Caucasus, 
including Caspian energy resources, the US war in 
Afghanistan, counter-terrorism, and the promotion of 
democratic institutions and practices. Today by con-
trast, clear principles are lacking. The situation under 
 
93 House of Representatives, William M. (Mac) Thornberry 
National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2021 (Washing-
ton, D.C., 2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/ 
house-bill/6395/text (accessed 10 December 2020). 
94 Joseph Larsen, What Has the United States Done for Georgia 
Lately? (Tbilisi: Georgian Institute of Politics, 29 August 2017), 
http://gip.ge/united-states-done-georgia-lately/ (accessed 11 
March 2020). 
95 Congress of the United States of America, John S. McCain 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Washing-
ton, D.C., 3 January 2018). 
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Trump, where agencies in Washington were not only 
inadequately coordinated but in some cases openly 
mistrustful, only exacerbated the problem. That has 
naturally been detrimental to policy coherence – not 
only towards the South Caucasus. 
Official statements from Tbilisi in connection with 
the Strategic Partnership suggest that the Georgian 
leadership is working actively to put their country 
back more firmly on America’s strategic “radar” by 
defining their own imagined geography and establish-
ing it in Washington. In this sense, Georgia advertises 
itself as a constructive factor for Black Sea Security. 
US naval vessels have stepped up port visits to demon-
strate support. Integrating Georgia into NATO’s Black 
Sea Security process is increasingly discussed. The role 
of the latter is also to be expanded within the frame-
work of the overhauled SNGP.96 It remains question-
able however, how successful Georgia’s attempts to 
position itself strategically in terms of security policy 
in the context of the Strategic Partnership can be, as 
long as an American vision for the region is lacking.97 
 
96 See for example Government of Georgia, “‘US-Georgia 
Relations Are at All Time High and We Are Very Proud of 
It’, States Prime Minister of Georgia”, Tbilisi, 23 April 2019, 
http://gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=526&info_id= 
71302 (accessed 14 August 2020); Alexandra Kuimova/Sie-
mon T. Wezeman, Georgia and Black Sea Security, SIPRI Back-
ground Paper (Solna: Stockholm International Peace Re-
search Institute [SIPRI], December 2018), 6, https://www. 
sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-12/bp_1812_black_sea_ 
georgia_0.pdf (accessed 14 August 2020); or at the Meeting 
of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs in April 2020: “NATO 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs Agree on New Measures to Sup-
port Georgia and Ukraine in the Context of Black Sea Secu-




14 August 2020). While the SNGP includes a naval com-
ponent, observers point out that NATO itself does not (yet) 
have a clear strategy for the Black Sea – in part because 
NATO members differ in their threat assessments for the 
region. Ben Hodges, Janusz Bugajski, Ray Wojcik and Cars-
ten Schmiedl, One Flank, One Threat, One Presence: A Strategy for 
NATO’s Eastern Flank (Washington D.C.: Center for European 
Policy Analysis, May 2020); Stephen J. Flanagan et al., Russia, 
NATO, and Black Sea Security (Santa Monica: RAND Corpora-
tion, 2020). 
97 There are also impediments on the Georgian side. The 
country’s Black Sea coast is comparatively short and it no 
longer possesses a navy, which was merged with the coast-
guard under the Ministry of the Interior in 2008. See also 
As well as the Black Sea, US engagement in Georgia 
potentially ties in with strategically significant neigh-
bouring countries and regions such as Iran, the Middle 
East and Turkey. One example was the visit to the 
South Caucasus by then National Security Adviser 
John Bolton in October 2018, seeking support for US 
sanctions against Iran. But such sporadic initiatives 
are a far cry from a comprehensive US regional strat-
egy that would embed Georgia in more multi-dimen-
sional strategic thinking and on which Georgia could 
build its own policies.98 
Tbilisi conceives the Black Sea not only in strategic 
security terms but also as an economic factor, as one 
leg of a trade corridor linking Asia and Europe. Here 
Georgia’s function is a geographical crossroads – and 
anything but peripheral. Tbilisi’s efforts, though, to 
communicate the idea of Georgia as a central actor 
on an east-west trade axis evaporate in Washington’s 
strategic vacuum. Statements by US Secretary of State 
Pompeo in June 2019 demonstrate that the United 
States also critically registers Russia’s – and also Chi-
na’s – economic influence in the region.99 But in the 
economic sphere, too, the United States lacks a stra-
tegic concept for whether and how to respond to Chi-
nese and Russian influence in Georgia and the region. 
With its EU-Asia Connectivity Strategy, the European 
Union has published a concept that can be interpret-
ed as a European alternative to the Eurasian elements 
of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The New Silk 
Road Initiative launched in 2011 by then US Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton, appears to exist only on paper; 
it was geographically more limited than the BRI any-
way, and largely focussed on Afghanistan.100 The US-
 
Deborah Sanders, Maritime Power in the Black Sea (New York: 
Routledge, 2014), 115ff. 
98 See also Iulia-Sabina Joja, US Engagement in the Black Sea 
and Middle East: What More Can Be Done? (Washington, D.C.: 
Middle East Institute, 8 April 2020), https://www.mei.edu/ 
publications/us-engagement-black-sea-and-middle-east-what-
more-can-be-done (accessed 14 August 2020). The example 
of Iran also indicates how such linkage could face Tbilisi 
with uncomfortable choices. 
99 This was not always the case in relation to China: Wash-
ington initially viewed Beijing’s growing Eurasian engage-
ment positively as a possible diversification option vis-à-vis 
Russia. 
100 The initiative focussed above all on Central Asia. The 
South Caucasus, which has been separate from Central Asia 
in the structures of the US Department of State since 2005, 
was not explicitly mentioned. Marlene Laruelle, “The US Silk 
Road: Geopolitical Imaginary or the Repackaging of Strategic 
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supported Three Seas Initiative connects countries 
from the Baltic via the Black Sea to the Adriatic with 
a focus on expanding transport, energy and digital 
infrastructures.101 But even if Georgia is occasionally 
mentioned in this context, the initiative is currently 
restricted to EU member states. 
Partnership in the Pandemic 
Surprisingly, in view of the lack of strategic vision in 
relation to the region and the Trump administration’s 
poor showing in the fight against Covid-19, Washing-
ton’s reputation in Georgia has grown in the course 
of the pandemic. The main factor behind this is the 
Richard G. Lugar Center for Public Health Research 
in Tbilisi, which opened 2011 with US funding and 
expertise and is today run by Georgia.102 
The “Lugar Lab” and other regional laboratories in 
the country owe their existence to the U.S. Coopera-
tive Threat Reduction Program, which was established 
to assist post-Soviet nations in combatting dangerous 
pathogens, improving laboratory infrastructure and 
establishing biosecurity capacities.103 The Center bears 
the name of the late Republican Senator Richard 
Lugar, who promoted the initiative together with his 
Democrat colleague Sam Nunn. The Lugar Lab has 
provided testing capacity for SARS-CoV2 and has play-
ed an extraordinarily important role nationally. Its 
head, Paata Imnadze, is one of the four prominent 
experts who have guided the country’s pandemic re-
sponse, which until autumn 2020 – when the situa-
tion severely deteriorated – was comparably success-
ful. In a representative survey by the US National 
Democratic Institute published in June 2020, 66 
percent of respondents said they believed the Lugar 
Lab was preventing the spread of Covid-19. As con-
 
Interests?” Eurasian Geography and Economics 56, no. 4 (2015): 
360–75. 
101 Congressional Research Service, The Three Seas Initiative, 
In Focus, 12 May 2020, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF11547.pdf 
(accessed 14 August 2020). In spring 2020 US Secretary of 
State Pompeo proposed funding of up to $1 billion for proj-
ects under the initiative. 
102 The Center also still houses the U.S. Army Medical 
Research Directorate-Georgia, an outpost of the Walter Reed 
Army Institute of Research. 
103 James C. Bartholomew et al., “Building Infectious 
Disease Research Programs to Promote Security and Enhance 
Collaborations with Countries of the Former Soviet Union”, 
Frontiers in Public Health 3, no. 271 (2015). 
cerns external support, 46 percent said the United 
States was supporting Georgia in the fight against the 
virus – while the EU was seen as supportive by 45 
percent, China by 32 percent. In a survey published 
by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in 
August 2020, 47 percent said the United States was 
the most important external supporter; the corre-
sponding figure for China was just 6 percent.104 
Soon after it opened the Lugar Lab was subject to 
attacks, above all by pro-Russian actors in Georgia 
and from Russia itself. It was alleged that its research 
activities were a danger to the public, and the facility 
was even said to be developing biological weapons.105 
When the Covid-19 pandemic hit in spring 2020, the 
attacks sharpened. Now Chinese channels joined the 
Russian disinformation campaign, claiming that the 
Lugar Lab and other facilities in post-Soviet countries 
were part of an American network for developing and 
deploying biological weapons, and that they were im-
plicated in the current crisis. In fact the laboratory 
is an example of cooperation with the United States 
directly benefitting large parts of the population.106 
Health cooperation between Washington and 
Tbilisi is also part of the Strategic Partnership, even 
if it attracts a great deal less attention than the other 
dimensions discussed above. The Joint Statement of 
the 2017 U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership Commis-
sion Working Group on People-to-People and Cultural 
Exchanges, for example mentions “continuing co-
operation with the U.S. Centers for Disease Control to 
 
104 National Democratic Institute (NDI), Public Attitudes in 
Georgia: Results of June 2020 Survey (Washington, D.C., June 
2020), https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/NDI%20Georgia 
%20Poll%20Results_June_2020_Final%20Version_ENG.pdf 
(accessed 14 August 2020). IRI, Public Opinion Survey: Residents 
of Georgia. June–July 2020 (Washington, D.C., 12 August 2020), 
10, https://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/iri_poll_ presentation-
georgia_june_2020_general-aug_4_corrections_1.pdf (accessed 
6 September 2020). 
105 Zaal Anjaparidze, “Russia Dusts Off Conspiracy Theo-
ries about Georgia’s Lugar Center Laboratory in Midst of 
COVID-19 Crisis”, Eurasia Daily Monitor 17, no. 62 (5 May 2020), 
https://jamestown.org/program/russia-dusts-off-conspiracy-
theories-about-georgias-lugar-center-laboratory-in-midst-of-
covid-19-crisis/; “Foreign Experts: Lugar Lab Is Transparent 
in Its Activities”, Civil.ge (online), 18 November 2018, https:// 
civil.ge/archives/266268 (accessed 1 October 2020). 
106 Paul Stronski, “Ex-Soviet Bioweapons Labs Are Fighting 
COVID-19: Moscow Doesn’t Like It”, Foreign Policy (online), 
25 June 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/25/soviet-
bioweapons-labs-georgia-armenia-kazakhstan-coronavirus-
russia-disinformation/ (accessed 14 August 2020). 
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increase treatment levels and reduce levels of infec-
tion”.107 The United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) in particular works to expand 
and improve capacities in the Georgian health sys-
tem.108 
The beginning of the Covid-19 crisis coincided with 
Kelly Degnan taking office as US ambassador at the 
end of January 2020, after the post had been vacant 
for almost two years. This is also likely to reinforce 
Washington’s profile in Georgia. Degnan is an experi-
enced career diplomat, particularly well versed in 
security policy, and likely to enhance the visibility of 
Washington’s position and its influence on the ground. 
Since her appointment Degnan has also demonstrated 
her willingness to comment on political developments 
in Georgia, indicating that she is keeping an eye on 
Georgian reforms. 
 
107 U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement of the 2017 
U.S.-Georgia Strategic Partnership Commission Working 
Group on People-to-People and Cultural Exchanges” 
(see note 77). 
108 Irakli Sirbiladze, “How the Partnership with the West 
Shaped Georgia’s COVID-19 Response”, New Eastern Europe, 
22 April 2020, https://neweasterneurope.eu/2020/04/22/how-
the-partnership-with-the-west-shaped-georgias-covid-19-
response/ (accessed 14 August 2020). 
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For more than ten years now the Strategic Partnership 
has shaped relations between the United States and 
Georgia. It is certainly not a static affair. Both sides 
have attempted to advance their priorities for and ex-
pectations of the bilateral relationship. These mutual 
expectations, ascribed functions, and associated rights 
and obligations intersect but are not entirely con-
gruent. 
For the United States the Strategic Partnership is 
more than just a “cheap” option to signal ongoing 
solidarity and express American leadership. From 
the beginning, Washington has also treated it as an 
instrument for actively supporting political develop-
ments within Georgia, with an eye to pursuing its 
own priorities and further consolidating values like 
democracy and rule of law. Although – as the regu-
lar joint statements confirm – the Strategic Partner-
ship is already based on shared values, it also offers 
Washington leverage to advance domestic reforms in 
Georgia (or at least the possibility of monitoring).109 
Examples include the critical public statements di-
rected towards Tbilisi in winter 2019/2020 by senior 
members of US Congress. The latter at the same time 
underlines Georgia’s role in Washington as a “show-
case of democracy”. 
The aspect of shared values is important from the 
Georgian perspective as well and forms a central 
thread of the bilateral “conversation”. But it also con-
stantly exposes the ongoing distance and asymmetry 
between the two partners. Tbilisi may point to demo-
cratic achievements to underline Georgia’s impor-
tance for the United States – and the EU – and 
 
109 In that respect the US-Georgian Strategic Partnership 
fits into the predominant pattern of Washington’s partner-
ships. Zhongqi Pan and Anna Michalski, “Contending Logics 
of Strategic Partnership in International Politics”, Asia Europe 
Journal, no. 17 (2019): 265–80 (274); Sean Kay, “What Is a 
Strategic Partnership?” Problems of Post-Communism 47, no. 3 
(2000): 15–24 (18). 
anchor it in “the West”. But as well as successes of 
democratisation, Washington – and Brussels – 
register discrepancies between rhetoric and practice. 
These tend to accentuate and reproduce rather than 
overcome Georgia’s intermediate geopolitical status, 
its liminality, and the asymmetry of the relation-
ships.110 
Like its predecessors, the Georgian Dream govern-
ment therefore works actively to boost Georgia’s stra-
tegic significance for and partnership with Washing-
ton. To that end it prioritises security and defence 
(“Black Sea Security”) and recently also economic and 
trade cooperation (“Georgia as hub”). Whether or not 
Washington remains, as asserted during the Saakash-
vili/Bush era, the “second arena of Georgian politics”,111 
close relations remain central for Tbilisi. They also 
represent an important “currency” in domestic (party-) 
political competition. This was observed in the run-up 
to the October 2020 parliamentary elections. Unlike 
its predecessors, the current government faces an 
additional challenge in connection with the construc-
tion of relevance: Since the end of the Bush admin-
istration the American side has had no clear strategic 
regional policy to which Tbilisi could relate. Instead 
Washington’s policy towards Georgia and the region 
under Donald Trump has been characterised above all 
 
110 Nutsa Batiashvili, The Bivocal Nation: Memory and Identity 
on the Edge of Empire (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2018), xi; Shota Kakabadze, “The East in the West: South 
Caucasus between Russia and the European Union”, Polity 52, 
no. 2 (2020): 273–87; Bahar Rumelili, “Liminal Identities 
and Processes of Domestication and Subversion in Inter-
national Relations”, Review of International Studies 38, no. 2 
(2012): 495–508 (502f.). While liminality per se can be un-
derstood as a productive space of opportunity and new pos-
sibilities, enduring liminality tends to erode these positive 
attributes. Maria Mälksoo, “The Challenge of Liminality for 
International Relations Theory”, Review of International Studies 
38, no. 2 (2012): 481–94 (489). 
111 De Waal, Mrs. Clinton Goes to Georgia (see note 25). 
Conclusion: Inertia and 
a Need for New Ideas 
Conclusion: Inertia and a Need for New Ideas 
SWP Berlin 
The Strategic Partnership between Georgia and the United States: Vision Wanted 
December 2020 
32 
by inertia. While this helped to compensate internal 
tensions in Washington and the lack of a coordinated 
multi-agency strategy – and as such to uphold US 
influence – it provided little in the way of new input 
for the relationship. Security and defence represents 
an exception, where military cooperation has been 
adjusted to see the United States explicitly supporting 
Georgia’s territorial defence. This demonstrates that 
innovations in the bilateral cooperation are possible, 
where an institutional interest exists. 
It is not only to Tbilisi’s disadvantage, however, if 
Washington’s Georgia policy has been less strategic 
and the region has attracted rather little attention, 
especially compared to the Bush administration. It 
is conceivable for example that the growing tensions 
between the United States and China will also rub 
off on Washington’s perspective on Georgia and the 
South Caucasus. That would inevitably have a bearing 
on Tbilisi’s project to establish Georgia as a logistics 
hub on an east-west axis connecting China and 
Europe. 
As yet, however, Washington has no regional re-
sponse to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The Rus-
sian factor, though, already harbours possible impon-
derables or even disruptive potential for Georgian-
American relations – in particular should the geo-
politicisation of American foreign policy persist. Anti-
Russian sentiment in the US Congress, upon which 
Georgia has long relied to nurture relationships with 
US politicians, is not unequivocally positive for Geor-
gian Dream. Party leader Bidzina Ivanishvili in par-
ticular is viewed with mistrust in Congress, among 
other things on account of his former business deal-
ings in Russia.112 
What implications does the American-Georgian 
relationship have for German and EU policy towards 
Georgia? The United States welcomes Georgia moving 
closer to the European Union. This also fits with the 
US line of expecting greater burden-sharing from 
European partners. Despite sharing an Association 
Agreement and a Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Area (DCFTA) with Georgia, the EU receives 
barely a mention in the joint statements on the Stra-
 
112 Some members of Congress do also tend to employ a 
simplistic pro-Russian/anti-Russian dichotomy to advance 
the particular interests of private-sector actors they repre-
sent, squeezing such interests into such a foreign policy 
framework to grant them geopolitical weight. 
tegic Partnership.113 At the practical level, however, 
the EU-Georgian Association Agreement is certainly 
taken into account, for example in US-funded devel-
opment projects. There is also at least situational 
cooperation on the ground, as also reflected in joint 
statements by the respective embassies in Tbilisi in 
response to political developments. 
For all the Trumpian “America First” rhetoric, the 
United States remains the decisive partner from the 
Georgian perspective where security and defence co-
operation is concerned. This remains the case despite 
a degree of security-related disillusionment following 
the August War and the opinion in certain quarters 
that authorisation of Tbilisi’s widely discussed Javelin 
anti-tank-missile purchase was driven principally 
by Washington’s Ukraine policy. The more recent 
cooperation to support Georgian territorial defence 
underlines Washington’s unchallenged role in this 
area. By serving one of Tbilisi’s principal concerns, it 
in a way relieves the European Union, whose security 
profile in the region is weak, or in the case of the EU 
Monitoring Mission orientated on conflict manage-
ment and resolution.114 
As far as the economic dimension is concerned, 
however, the EU is streets ahead. The possibility of a 
free trade agreement between Tbilisi and Washington 
at some future point would do nothing to change 
that. In a sense, one could speak of a de facto division 
of labour between Washington and Brussels, admit-
tedly without this ever having been explicitly agreed. 
But Brussels cannot rely on Washington continuing 
the arrangement in its current form, especially as 
Washington is currently expecting more of the EU in 
its own neighbourhood. And one decisive component 
is lacking: Although the United States and the EU 
each possess formats for bilateral cooperation – with 
the Strategic Partnership and the Association Agree-
ment respectively – neither has a strategic concept 
for Georgia. For the foreseeable future Georgia will be 
joining neither NATO nor the EU. That places limits 
on cooperation. As such, then, the Strategic Partner-
ship with the United States and association with 
the EU both perpetuate Georgia’s liminal status, its 
in-betweenness. The current political leadership in 
Tbilisi is holding its Euro-Atlantic course; and public 
 
113 The EU-Georgia Association Agreement was signed in 
2014 and came into force in 2016. 
114 While the United States remains Georgia’s central secu-
rity partner, Tbilisi also notes the discord in the transatlantic 
relationship and the discussion about the future of NATO. 
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support for Euro-Atlantic integration remain com-
paratively strong, despite fluctuations and certain 
objections.115 Given the partly diverging expectations 
of the respective mutual relationships, however, 
the Western partners cannot be certain that this will 
remain so in the absence of a strategic vision for 
Georgia and the region. The question of new inputs 
and strategic objectives therefore applies not only 
to American-Georgian relations. It also needs to be 
given earnest consideration in Brussels. 
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115 In a representative survey published by NDI in June 
2020 76 percent of respondents said they supported joining 
the EU, and 69 percent supported joining NATO. In the IRI 
survey published in August 2020 87 percent supported 
joining the EU (64 percent fully, 23 percent somewhat), 
while 78 percent supported joining NATO (56 percent fully, 
22 percent somewhat). NDI, Public Attitudes in Georgia (see note 
104); IRI, Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Georgia (see note 
104), 58, 62; Batiashvili, Bivocal Nation (see note 110), 16ff. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
